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The CIA under Harry Truman
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The CIA under Harry Truman
CIA Cold War Records
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CIA Cold War Records
The CIA under Harry Truman
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Foreword ix Preface xi Sources and Declassification Xxix Acronyms and Abbreviations XXXi Persons Mentioned XXXili Chronology xli Part I: From OSS to CIA 1
1. William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President, 3
13 September 1945 2. William D. Leahy, Memorandum for the Secretary of War and 5
Secretary of the Navy, “Establishment of a central intelligence
service upon liquidation of OSS,” 19 September 1945
Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945 11 4. Truman to Donovan, 20 September 1945 15
Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford, 17 27 December 1945
6. John Magruder, Memorandum for Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, 21 “Assets of SSU for Peace-time Intelligence Procurement,” 15 January 1946
7. Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946 29
8. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the National 33 Intelligence Authority's 2nd Meeting, 8 February 1946
9. Netional ineligence Authority Directive 1. “Policies and 35
Procedures Governing the Central Intelligence Group,” 8 February 1946
10. Central Intelligence Group, “Daily Sumamary,” 15 February 1946 39. cs
11. Souers to National Intelligence Authority, “Progress Report onthe 41 Central Intelligence Group,” 7 june 1948 =
12. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for the Record, 17 July 1946
13. National minutes of the NIA’ ase bastiggees Achat s 4th Meeting,
14. Clifford to Leahy, 18 July 1946 aie “Beye , “Soviet Foreign
3; B/S) ays}
16. Leahy to General [Hoyt S.] Vandenberg, ———
17. Leahy to the President, 21 August 1946 79
: : 18. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the President, 24 August 1946 81 | 19. Ludwell L. M Memorandum for General “Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE,” 24 September 1 | 20. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the Assistant Director for ial 87 Operations [Donald Galloway], “Functions of the Office of Special 7 Operations,” 25 October 1946 : 21. CIG Intelligence Report, 16 December 1946 9: j 22. Donald Bs Menmantem far Gn Beasutive wo Ge Divster 93 Survey of the CIG Daily and Summaries’ as it was Prepared by OCD on 9 1946," 2 January 1947 23. CIG, Office of R>ports and Estimates, ORE 1/1, “Revised Soviet 99 Tactics in International Affairs,” 6 January 1947 24. Walter L. Pforzheimer, Memorandum for the Record, “Proposed 105 Legislation for C.i.G.,” 28 January 1947 25. CIG Intelligence Report, 11 February 1947 111 26. ion Authority, minutes of the NIA’s 9th Meeting, 113 12 February 1947 27. M Memorandum for the Assistant Director, R & E 123
{J. ee eons ee Oe ane the C.1.G. Daily and Weekly Summaries,” 26 February 1947
28. CIG Intelligence Report, 27 February 1947 125 29. Elsey to Clifford, “Central Intelligence Group,” 14 March 1947 127
4 Part II: The CIA under DCI Hillenkoetter 129 | : 30. National Security Act of 1947, 26 July 1947 (Excerpt) 131 31. R. H. Hillenkoetter to the National Intelligence 137
“National Security Act of 1947,” 11 September 1947 (Excerpt)
32. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates, 139 CIA 1, “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security
of the United States,” 26 September 1947 33. Sos SS. eneareqeanece of Go Festiten of Petetnn,” 149 34. National Security Council, NSCID 1, 12 December 1947 109 35. National Security Council, NSC 4-A, 17 December 1947 173 36. National Security Council, NSCID 7, 12 February 1948 177 37. ORE 47/1, “The Current Situation in Italy,” 16 February 1948 181 38. Hillenkootter, Memorandum for the Assiste=t Director for 191
Operations (Galloway), “Additonal functions of fice of
39. Pforzheimer to Arthur H. Schwartz, 6 May 1948 197
40. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Executive Secretary [Souers}], 201 “Psychological Operations,” 11 May 1942 41. Hillenkoetter to J. S. Lay, 9 June 1948 203
42. ORE 41-48, “Effect of Soviet Restrictions on the US Position in 207 Berlin,” 14 June 1948
a ee
: 43. National Security Council, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948 213 44. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Record, 4 August 1948 217
45. ORE 25-48, “The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and its 219 Implications for US ,” 3 September 1948
46. Lawrence R. Houston, Memorandum for the Director, 235 “Responsibility and Control for OPC,” 19 October 1948
47. Frank G. Wisner, Memorandum for the Director of Central 241 Intelligence, “OPC Projects,” 29 October 1948
48. [ wating iy ], “Observations on the Communist ‘Peace 243
21 January 1949
49. Vins, Menonndun fr ie Diss o Ca ilipars 247 “Observations the report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report to the National Council,” 14 February 1949
50. ORE 41-49, “Effects of a ‘J.S. Foreign Military Aid Program,” 251 24 February 1949
51. ORE 3-49, of US Troop Withdrawal From Koreain 265 Spring, 1949,” 28 1949
59. ORE 29-49, “Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China,” 275 15 April 1949
53. Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 20 June 1949 287
54. National Security Council, NSC 50, 1 July 1949 295
55. Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for CIA Assistant Directors, 315
“Approval by the NSC of Much of the Dulles Report,” 12 July 1949
56. [ORE], Intelligence Memorandum 225, “Estimate of Statusof 319 Atomic 'Yarfare in the USSR,” 20 September 1949
57. Finance Division to Executive, OPC (Wier), “CIA Responsibility 321 OPC 17 Octobe: 1949 ited
58. C. V. H. (Charles V. Hulick), Memorandum for the Record, “Policy 323 Guidance,” 19 April 1950
59. C. Ofte to ADPC (Wisner), “Conversation with Messrs. [ k- 325 15, 16 April i950,” 24 April 1950 60. ORE 32-50, °The Bfect of the the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs 327
on the Security of the United States,” 9 June 1950
61. [ORE], “The Korean Situation,” 16 Sc;tember 1950
335
62. Chief, D/Pub [R. Jack Smith] to AD/ORE [Theodore Babbitt], “Contents of the CIA Daily Summary,” 21 September 1950
337
Part ill: The Smith Years
63. Houston to Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, 29 August 1950
64. pee ements Se Cenaee ot Cones ae. “Interpretation of NSC 10/2 and Related Matters,” 12 October 1950
65. Smith, Memorandum for the President, 12 October 1950
66. National In Estimate 12, “Consequences of the Early
eee Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” 27 1950
67. Milton W. Buffington to CSP [Lewis S. ], “United States National Student Association,” 17 February 1951
68. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Deputy Director of poy i [William H. Jackson), “Problems of OSO,”
g
69. J. S. Earman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, “King Abdullah's Assassination,” 20 July 1951
70. Special Estimate 9, “Probable Immediate in the Far East Following a Failure in the Cease-Fire in Korea,”
6 Augus: 1951
71. Estimate 13, “Probable Developments in the World Through Mid-1953,” 24 September 1951
72. [Office of the DCT), “Staff Conference,” 22 October 1951 (Excerpt)
73. National Security Council, NSC 10/5, 23 October 1951
74. Pforzheimer, Memorandum for th: Record, “CLA Appropriations,” 25 October 1951
75. [Office of the DCI), “Staff Conference,” 21 November 1951
76. Barman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, “Estimate of Situation in Guatemala,” 14 January 1952
77. Wisner, Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, “Reported on arene atm” Cultural Freedom,” 7 April 1952.
78. Smith, Memorandum fer the National S Council, “Report by the Director of Central Intelligence,” 23 April 1952
79. Smith to SR man Ceptenton of CLA Chnterton
80. [Office of the DCI), “Staff Conference,” 1 October 1952
$1. Truman, Remarks of the President, 21 November 1952
Foreword
The CIA under Harry Truman
The History Staff is publishing this new collection of declassified docu- ments in conjunction with the Intelligence History Symposium, “The Ori- gin and Development of the CIA in the Administration of Harry S. Truman,” which CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence is cosponsor- ing in March 1994 with the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and its Institute. This is the third volume in the CIA Cold War Records series that began with the 1992 publication of CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, and continued with the publication in 1993 of Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959. These three volumes of declassified documents—and more will follow—result from CIA’s new commitment to greater openness, which former Director of Central Intel- ligence Rebert M. Gates first announced in February 1992, and which Director R. James Woolsey has reaffirmed and expanded since taking office in February 1993.
The Center for the Study of Intelligence, a focal point for internal CIA research and publication since 1975, established the Cold War Records Program in 1992. In that year the Center was reorganized to include the History Staff, first formed in 1951, and the new Historical Review Group, which has greatly extended the scope and accelerated the pace of the pro- gram to declassify historical records that former Director William J. Casey established in 1985.
Dr. Michael Warner of the History Staff compiled and edited this collec- tion of documents and all of its supporting material. A graduate of the University of Maryland, Dr. Warner took a history M.A. from the Univer- sity of Wisconsin in 1984 and received his Ph.D. in history from the Uni- versity of Chicago in 1990. Before joining the History Staff in August 1992, Dr. Warner served as an analyst in CIA’s Directorate of Intelli-
gence.
As with the previous volumes in this series, we are grateful for the abun- dant skill and help of the Historical Review Group, which persuaded a host of overburdened deciassification reviewers in CIA and other agen- cies and departments not only to release these records, but also to do it
a ee ee eS ee
=. - i —- = = —) =". "= 7
and all those talented members of the Directorate of Intelligence’s Design Center and Publications Center and of the Directorate of Admin- istration’s Printing and Photography Group whose professional contribu-
J. Kenneth McDonald Chief, CIA History Staff
The CIA under Harry Truman
Preface Emerging from World War II as the world’s strongest power, the United
States was hardly equipped institutionally or temperamentally for world leadership. In the autumn of 1945 many Americans, in and out of govern- ment, were not at all eager to wield their nation’s power to bring about
some new global order. Indeed, many—perhaps most—Americans
| thought that victory over the Axis powers would in itself ensure peace
: and stability. In any event, Americans remained confident that the United
: States would always have enough time and resources to beat back any foreign threat befcre it could imperil our shores.
America’s wartime leaders, however, knew from experience that the nation could never return to its prewar isolation. President Truman bore the full weight of this knowledge within weeks of the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In July 1945, as he discussed the future of Europe with Joseph Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Clement Attlee at Potsdam, Tru- man secretly authorized the use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities. The unexpectedly rapid defeat of Japan and the growing tensions between the United States and the USSR over occupation policies in Germany and Eastern Europe persuaded many observers that the wartime Grand Alli- ance of America, Britain, and Russia was breaking up, and that the United Stetes might soon confrent serious new dangers in the postwar world.
In responding to this challenge, the Truman administration in 1946 and
1947 created a new peacetime foreign intelligence organization that was not part of any department or military service. The early history of that new body, which became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), offers a window on the Truman administration's foreign policy—a window that this volume seeks to open a little wider. By describing American plans and actions in founding and managing the ration's new central intelli- gence service, this volume should help scholars to identify the key deci- sions that animated the CIA, and to fit them into the context of the Cold War's first years.
The CIA’s early growth did not follow a predestined course. Two histori- cal events—one past, the other contemporary—were uppermost in the minds of the Truman administration officials who founded and built CIA. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated that the United States needed ».1 effective, modern waming capability. Soon after , this disaster it was clear that the intelligence failure z* Pearl Harbor was
primarily one of coordiration—that analysts had failed to collate all available clues to Japanese intentions ard movements. The seconc event—Stalin’s absorption of Eastern Europe—occurred before the: wor- ried eyes of the Truman administration. The war in Europe was barely over when American and foreign reports on Soviet conduct in the occu- pied territories began to trouble observers in Washington, London, and other capitals. Although the lessons of Pearl Harbor were perhaps upper- most in the minds of the President and his advisers ir: 1946 and 1947, their concern over Soviet conduct eventually dominated the organization
of a postwar intelligence capability.
During World War II the United States had built a formidable intelli- gence and covert action agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1944, its chief, Wiliam J. Donovan, formally urged the President to cre- ate a permanent, worldwide intelligence service after the war ended. Pres- ident Roosevelt made no and after Roosevelt's death (and the German surrender) President Truman felt no compulsion to keep OSS alive. America’s commanders in the Pacific had no use for Donovan and OSS, and Truman hiruself feared that Donovan's proposed centralized, peacetime intelligence establishment might one day be used against Americans.'
Recognizing the need for an organization to coordinate intelligence for policymakers, however, President Truman had solicited proposals for cre- ating such a capability even before he abolished OSS.* In his Executive order dissolving the Office on 1 October 1945, he noted that America neected “a comprehensive and coordinated foreign inteiligence program.” Over Donovan's objections, Truman gave the State Department the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, while the War Department adopted the remnants of the OSS clandestine collection and counterinte'!igence branches, which it named the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The capabil- ity that OSS had developsd to perform “subversive operations abroad” was abandoned.’
In late 1945 departmental attention and energies therefore turned to argu- ments over the powers to be given to a new intelligence office. The
State, War, and Navy Departments, who quickly agreed that they should
‘Richard Dunlop, Donevan: America’s Master Spy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), pp. 467-468; William J. Donovan to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 25 Avgust 1945, reproduced in Thomas F. Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Estab- SMe a hesaerti aca ee Central Intelligence Agency, 1981),
S. Trane, Memoirs: Years Trial and Doubieday, a < Saget — Dosoven, Memorandum for the President, !3 September 45, Document |; Snsonive Order 5421, 20 Sept 1545, Decemaat 3.
oversee the proposed office, stood together against rival plans proposed by the Bureau of the Budget and J. Edgar Hoover's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Army and the Navy, however, would not accept the State Department’s demand that the new office’s director be selected by and accountable to the Secretary of State. The services instead pre- ferred a Joint Chiefs of Staff plan, which was also part of the report on Navy Secretary James Forrestai.‘ In December 1945 an impatient Presi- dent Truman asked to see both the State Der-~™ t's and the Joint Chiefs’ proposals and decided that the lat =... . simpler and more workable. After the holidays President T .: :an c:eated the Central Intelli- gence Group (CIG), in a diluted version ©» '-> proposal.’ President Truman persuaded one of the authors of the .verstadt plan, Sidney Souers, a Missouri businessman and Nava! Reserve Rear Admiral, to serve for a few months as the first Director of Central Inteliigence (DCI).° And so on 22 January 1946 che Central intelligence Group was born. Having signed a directive creating CIG, the President invited Re»; Admi- ral Souers to the White House two days later to award him a black cloak and wooden dagger as mock symbols of office.’
With only a handful of staffers—most loaned from the State and the services—CIG was but a shadow of the wartime OSS.' Directed
to coordinate the flow of intelligence to policymakers, it had no authority to collect clandestine foreign information from agents in the field or to
effect consensus among the various intelligence-producing departments.’ Last-minute compromises in the Joint Chiefs’ plan to appease the State
“Troy, Donovan and the CIA, pp. 297-0, 315, 322; William D. Leahy, Memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, “Esteblishment of a central invelligence ser- vice upon liquidation of OSS,” 19 September 1945, Documrat 2.
5Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford, 27 December 1945, Docuruen: 5; Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 339.
*Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, \1: 74-76. Sovers, a banker and insurance ex- ecutive who had been a prewar pillar of the Democratic Party in St. Lovis, later recalled that, on learning of Truman's nomination for the Senate in 1934, he had thought to himself, “1 would not hive that men in my business for more than $250 a ‘nonth.” After the war Souers be- came close to Truman and served the President as the National Security Council's first execu- tive secretary, from 1547 to 1950, and remained as an adviser on foreign affairs after leaving the NSC. William Heahoeffer and James Hanrahan, “Notes on the Early DCis,” Studies in In-
33 (Spring 1989): 29. to the Secretaries of State, Wer, and Navy, 22 January 1946, Document 7; Diary hay alee ape Bey rom bag op
*The history of CiG is recounted in several works. The most detailed is Arthur B. Darling, The Cemsral Intelligence An Instrervent of Government, to 1950 (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State Univeruity 1990). Thomas Troy's Donovan and the CIA discusses the of CiG at length. Anne Karelekas a beter but clear synopsis in her “His- tory of the Inselligence “ M. Learv, editor, The Coral Intelligence Agency: History and Documents AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984).
*ln ineelligence perience, “ciandestine collection” is a term for the secret gathering of nfor-
, ——a 0 2) ee ee 4
Department and the Bureau of the Budget had made CIG an interdepart- mental body that lacked its own budget and personne!.'° But from this humble beginning CIG soon began to grow. President Truman liked the Group’s Daily Summary, which spared him the trouble of wading
_ through the hundreds of intelligence and operational cables from overseas
posts that the departments passed on to the White House.'' CIG answered to the President through the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), which comprised the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, joined by the President’s representative, Fleet Admiral William Leahy, who was Chief of Steff to the Commander in Chief (and had headed the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1942). This proximity to the Oval Office, along with Leahy’s friendly patronage, gave DCI Souers more influence than CIG’s weak institutional arrangements might indicate. The President read the CIG’s Daily Summary and Weekly Summary six mornings a week, and Admiral Leahy helped the new Group overcome bureaucratic obstacles thrown in its path by jealous departments.'”
After five quiet months as DCI, Rear Admiral Souers returned to civilian life and his business interests. Souers informally nominated Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, US Army Air Forces, to follow him as DCI, knowing that Vandenberg had the clout and the inclination to build CIG into a position of real power in Washington. Nephew of the powerful Republi- can Senator, Arthur Vandenberg, the general had a distinguished war record in the Army Air Forces and aspired to command the independent United States Air Force that he hoped would soon be created. Although Vandenberg saw his stint with CIG as a temporary detour in his military career, he made the most of this opportunity to demonstrate his political and administrative talents by setting aside parochial service interests and working to expand the Group’s power and responsibility.'> Under his year-long directorship, CIG gained an independent budget and work force, and won authority to collect and analyze—as well as collate— intelligence.'* General Vandenberg also persuaded the White House that
© Troy, Donovan and the CIA, p. 346.
"! CIG sent its first Daily Summary to the President on 15 February 1946; see Central Intel- ligeace Group, Daily Seanmary, 15 February 1946, Document 10; Montague, Memorandum for the Assistant Director, RAE (J. Klahr Huddle}, “Conversation with Admiral Foskett the CLG. Daily and Weekly Summaries,” 26 February 1947, Document 27. For a glimpse at how the Deily Summary was written and edited in the carly days, see Russell Jack Smith, The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington: Pergamon-Brasecy's, 1989),
CIG in its present form was unworkable, and that a true central intelli- sional authorization.’
CIG grew as the Truman administration girded itself to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. In July 1946, to evaluate the increasingly dis- turbing cables and reports flowing into CIG, General Vandenberg created an Office of Research and Evaluation (which was soon renamed the Office of Reports and Estimates [ORE], at the State Department’s insis- tence). Although its structure prevented it from producing much more than “current intelligence” (daily and weekly analyses of events as they happen), ORE sent some short but timely analytical papers to policymak- ers.'° The first of these, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy” (ORE 1), was produced and informally coordinated in just four days in response to an anxious request from the White House.'’ ORE 1's prediction that Mos- cow would be “grasping and opportunistic” echoed the “long telegram” on Soviet policy and conduct that Chargé d’ Affaires George Kennan had sent from Moscow in February 1946, and seemed borne out by the accel- erating pace of events.'* Across Eastern Europe, CIG reported, Soviet occupation authorities worked with brutal efficiency to subvert the elec- tions mandated by wartime agreements, imposing Communist-dominated regimes while using diplomacy and subterfuge to confuse the West and spur the pace of Western demobilization.'? When Britain in February 1947 announced its intention to withdraw from Greece, leaving the field to Communist insurgents, the President announced his “Truman Doc- trine” to a joint session of Congress on 12 March. Going beyond the cri- ses in Greece and Turkey, President Truman depicted the Soviet advance in lowering terms:
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totali- tarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
'S George Elsey, Memorandum for the Record, 17 July 1946, Document 12.
16 Donald Edgar to the Executive to the Director [Edwin K. Wright], “An Adequacy Survey of ‘The Adequacy Survey of the CIO Daily and Weekly Summaries’ as it was Prepared by OCD on 9 December 1946,” 2 January 1947, Document 22. wins einenetan: op on 1946, Document 14. Clark Clifford and George
requested as they prepared a paper known today as the Clifford-Eisey Report. The President had esked Clifford for an account of Soviet violations of wartime and postwar
; ,
Democracy was threatened by a system that “relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and suppression of personal freedoms.” The President then stated the heart of his doc:rine of containment: “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” 7 Senator Arthur Vande: " rg, now president pro tem of the Senate, helped the President persuade che Repub- lican-controlled Congress to back this step. A few months later, in June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed his famous plan for the reconstruction of the European economy. Moscow rejected the Mar- shall Pian, and its client states followed suit.”!
All the while CIG had been expanding its capabilities. The Group gained | authority in August 1946 to analyze intelligence on foreign atomic weap- ons and development.” More important, CIG in 1946 and early 1947 absorbed the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit, the remnants of the old OSS foreign collection and counterespionage branches. In a sense, this was like a mouse eating an elephant. SSU was much larger than CIG, with dozens of overseas stations and its own procedures and files running back tc its wartime OSS origins; it was SSU that kept alive the spirit of the old OSS and eventually bequeathed it to CIA. The acquisi- tion of SSU gave CIG the responsibility and capability to collect clendes- tine foreign intelligence independently of other departments and services. In addition, General Vandenberg wrested the mission of gather- ing intelligence in Latin America away from FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover.” CIG’s worldwide collection capability was based in the new Office of Special Operations, America’s first, civilian clandestine ser- vice.“ When General Vandenberg returned to the Army Air Forces in May 1947, his CIG had become an impertant source of information for the President.
The rapid growth of one agency usually elicits an opposite (but not
always equal) resistance from officials and agencies that stand to lose influence and resources to the expanding office. DCI Vandenberg met this kind of resistance in meetings of the Intelligence Advisory Board
(IAB), a panel of uncertain authority comprising the chiefs of the depart-
mental and service staffs, which had been created to help the DCI coordinate . Vandenberg wanted the Director of Central ee es
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Intelligence Authority and to be answerable through the NIA io the Presi- dent. Although the NIA approved his suggestion in February 1947, the other members of the IAB balked at Vandenberg’s broad interpretation of his powers, and the general’s successor as DCI felt the inevitable back- lash.
To alternate DCIs from the Army and Navy, the White House in early 1947 looked for an admiral to succeed Vandenberg. On the advice of James Forrestal, President Truman tapped Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who had been a naval attaché in Vichy and Paris and served as chief of intelli- gence for Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific war. A newly promoted rear admiral, Hillenkoetter had neither Vandenberg’s rank nor his aggressive- ness.”
Hillenkoetter took only a marginal role in the debatc over the proposed National Security Act of 1947 (indeed, former DCI Vandenberg contin- ued to testify before Congress on the CIA section of the bill even after Hillenkoetter had become DCI).”’ Along with transforming CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency, the bill also proposed to form an indepen- dent Air Force, to place the armed services under a new Secretary of Defense, and to create a National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate defense and foreign policy. Although Congressional debates over the bill focused on its “unification” of the military, some Congressmen worried that the new CIA was a potential American Gestapo until General Van- denberg and other officials explained that the bill’s vague section on the CIA gave the Agency no police or subpoena powers, or internal security mission.”
The National Security Act won Congressional passage in July 1947, in a vote that was Congress’s first word on the executive branch’s creation of a peacetime foreign intelligence establishment (Congress had had virtu- ally no role in the origin and development of CIG).” The Act recognized and codified both President Truman’s original January 1946 CIG directive and General Vandeaberg’s bureaucratic victories, although for tactical reasons the White House had kept the Act’s section on the CIA as brief as possible and postponed a full enumeration of the Director's powers.”
35 National minutes of the NIA’s 9th 12 1947, ereaageenancee meeting, 12 February
3 After Sovers hed initially declined the job in late 1945, Forrestal hed proposed then Cap- tein Hillleakooter to be frst DCL. Although Admiral edmired Hilleakoower, he drafted Souers, who hed a ERO. Loseol L. Mammon. and compromises thet had
a CRU. b. General Walter Bedeli Smith as Director , sa.ginur fe ema 1992), pp. 35-36.
ital G. he ag, ref 16: -e~ ¢ rm .Y ae eae
Plorshelmer, Munoeun % ee ay
The Central Intelligence Group “ rmally became the Central Intelligence Agency on 18 September 1947, although Congress did not pass compre- hensive ens>ling legislation for the Agency until mid-1949.>!
That the CIA continued to grow under Hillenkoetter’s directorshin owed more to the alarming world situation than to any empire building on his part. Before the autumn of 1947 American concem over Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe had been one of several forces behind the creation of CIG and its successor, CIA, but the events of the winter of 1947-48 made this concern predominant in the development of the CIA’s author- ity and capabilities. Massive Communist-run strikes in France and Italy late in 1947, followed by the coup d’ état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, suggested that Stalin might not give the Marshall Plan (which was still hung up in Congress) time to rebuild the economies of Western
to fight fire with fire, matching the Soviets in propaganda and subterfuge.
Up to this time, however, no one had thought much about the nature and implications of covert action. The very term was rarely used. Instead, officials referred to separate components of what would later be collec- tively classed as covert operations. “Morale operations” or “psychologi- cal warfare” (essentially propaganda but embracing a variety of open and clandestine methods of bringing a message home to a target group) seemed to be something the State Department should do, at least in peacetime. On the other hard, unconventiunal, paramilitary, and sabo- tage operations looked useful for wartime; any capability to perform them seemed logically to belong to the military. What complicated the situation still further was that the Soviet Union, while not at war with anyone, had launched a political offensive apparently aimed at conquering peoples and territories as completely as if by armed invasion. This was truly “cold war,” and it confused the already murky issue of “peacetime” versus “wartime” operations.
Truman administration officials responded to the ambiguous situation with a creative ambiguity of their own. In November 1947 the new National Security Council briefly considered assigning the peacetime psy- chological warfare mission to the State Department, until dissuaded by Secretary of State George Marshall, who insisted that such a role might
operations. The fledgling CIA seemed the best place to put this capabil- ity; the Agency had a worldwide net of operatives (many of them OSS veterans) trained in clandestine work, and it possessed unvouchered funds, which meant there vould be no immediate need to approach Con- gress for new appropriations.** In December 1947 the National Security Council—over the misgivings of DCI Hillenkoetter—issued NSC 4-A. The directive pointed to “the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups” and determined that CIA was “the logical agency” to conduct
covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet- inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security.*°
NSC 4-A made the DCI alone responsible (and accountable to the NSC) for psychological operations, leaving him wide discretion in selecting tar- gets and techniques.”
With the assignment of the covert “psychological” mission, CIA had arrived as an important component of the Washington foreign policy establishmeat—one that was soon exercising its new authority to run operations in Europe. The Agency had its critics—such as 1948 Republi- can presidential candidate Thomas Dewey, who attacked the CIA for not warning of unrest in Colombia before Secretary of State Marshall attended the April 1948 Bogota conference of the Organization of Ameri- can States. The CIA, however, also had strong defenders in Congress and the executive branch. Indeed, informed opinion blamed the State Depart- ment, not the Agency, for ignoring CIA’s warning about the potential for riots in Bogota. The White House had not joined in the criticism of Hill- enkoetter over the riots; President Truman was getting a steady stream of reports and analyses from CIA on issues ranging from the events in West- em Europe to the proposed partition of Palestine.** Even before the Bogota incident, the new Special Procedures Branch (later Group) of the Office of Special Operations began operations against the Communists in
2 Darling, The Central intelligence Agency, pp. 253-262; Karalekas, “History of the Cen- tal Intelligen>se Agency,” pp. 40-41.
® National Scourity Council, NSC 4-A, 17 De 1947, Document 35.
* Darling, The Central intelligence Agency, pp. 260-261.
*S Pforzheimer to Artur H. Schwartz, 6 May 1948, Document 39.
* See, for exazaple, ORE 55, “The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine,” 28 Novem- ie aaa a Ye ee seen Decal 16 February 1948, Docu-
Europe.*’ Although some of these anti-Soviet activities ultimately proved futile, others worked as planned.
OSO’s foray into covert action did not last long. While the CIA gained in stature and influence as the Cold War deepened, DCI Hillenkoetter’s own standing with the NSC and the other departments declined. Hillenkoet- ter’s slow and cautious use of his mandate to conduct covert action satis- fied neither State nor Defense. At State in the spring of 1948 Policy Planning Staff chief George Kennan argued that the US Government needed a capability to conduct “political warfare” (psychological warfare along with direct covert intervention in the political affairs of other nations). Believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone, Kennan led the State Department’s bid to win substantial control over covert operations. State was backed by the military, which advocated an independent, or at least more powerful, psychological warfare office.™* Hillenkoetter saw what was coming and did his best to resist it, complain- ing to former DCI Sidney Souers (whom the President had persuaded to return to Washington to serve as NSC Executive Secretary) that CIA was in danger of losing control over psychological warfare.”
The DCI’s complaints tempered but did not prevent the NSC decision to intrude on CIA’s turf in a new directive, NSC 10/2, issued in June 1948 just as the Soviets clamped a blockade on West Berlin.” The directive technically expanded CIA's writ while actually infringing upon the Agen- cy’s freedom of action. It directed CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations to include
tage, anti-sabotage, demolition and ¢vacuation measures; subversion
a ee Ses ee ae ments, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous
anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.*!
At the same time, NSC 10/2 decreed that covert action would be run by a new office administratively quartered in CIA but supervised by the State Department and the military. In wartime the entire apparatus would shift to the Joint Chiefs’ bailiwick and would conduct unconventional opera- tions against the enemy. The anomalous new unit, called the Office of
57 The Special Procedures Branch had been established iz: OSO at the end of 1947 in re- sponse to NSC 4-A. For more os OSO's covert action efforts, see Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Assistant Disector for
est on Oe "14 — fy Cone, HC 10,
™ a bo silent asl tl
Policy Coordination (OPC), began life in the summer of 1948 under the directorship of Frank G. Wisner, an OSS veteran who had been serving as deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for the Occupied Areas.“
As Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Wisner’s mission was broad—perhaps too much so. NSC 10/2’s phrase “covert operations” cov- ered activities ranging from propaganda to economic sabotage to war planning. The vagueness of this mandate reflected its novelty, for Ameri- can officials had little experience with such methods and no body of doc- trine governing their use in peacetime. OPC never let indecision deter it, however, and quickly threw itself into a wide variety of operations. The affable but intense Wisner established a working relationship with DCI Hillenkoetter, but for operational direction Wisner looked more to George Kennan and the State Derartment’s Policy Planning Staff. This was to be expected, given Wi: .r's connections at State and Kennan’s strong per- sonality and ideas. ".ennan and State’s representative at OPC, Robert P. Joyce, pushed OF? iv undertake large-scale, continuing covert opera- tions even before tiie Office could establish procedures and hire the required personnel.”
With OPC now in the game, the CIA’s espionage-oriented Office of Spe- cia] Operations largely bowed out of covert action, a field it had only recently entered. Yet there was immediate tension between the two offices, which never truly worked as a team. Wisner’s well-funded OPC was soon competing with OSO for the services of the same agents and groups in the field and squabbling with it at Headquarters. The sense of competition was heightened by professional and even social distinctions between officers of the two offices. Many OSO officers who had served in OSS and stuck with the intelligence business through lean times in SSU and CIG considered the new OPC hands amateurs and novices. OPC was awash in funds and expanding rapidly, however, and Wisner’s new officers were often better paid than their veteran OSO counterparts. Each Office tended to discount the importance of the other’s work: OSO people disdained OPC activists as “cowboys”; while many in OPC viewed their mission as more important than the espionage of OSO’s plodding case
“ Darling, The Central intelligence Agency, pp. 262-273; Karalekas, “History of the Cea- tral Agency.” pp. 41-42.
“ G. Wisner, Memorandur: for the Director of Central Intelligence, “OPC Projects,” 29 October 1948, Document 47; Vidlenkootter, Memorandum for the Record, 4 August 1948, Document 44; Lawrence R. Hom‘va, Memorandum for the Director, “Responsibility ead Con- trol fer OPC,” 19 October 1948, Document 46. was a Foreign Service officer who had also served in OSS in the wer, and in OSO until 1947.
Ve
i ee |
officers. The OSO-OPC rivalry soon prompted CIA officials to consider a merger.“
The disconnect between OPC and OSO was only one manifestation of the CIA's internal disorganization under DCI Hillenkoetter —a situation that an NSC study group report made painfully obvious in early 1949. Secre- tary of Defense Forrestal had selected three New York lawyers—Allen Dulles, William Jackson, and Matthias Correa, all of whom had intelli- gence experience—to survey the Agency and report to the NSC on its workings. Their survey was hardly disinterested. Alivn Dulles, the pane!’s chairman, was a Republican supporter of Thomas Dewey's 1948 presi- dential bid who believed that CIA should be headed by a civilian.“ Indeed, Dulles was one of many OSS veterans who believed along with General Donovan that the nation had to have a peacetime secret service that looked a lot like OSS. By late 1948 the CIA had gradually acquired the powers and responsibilities wielded by OSS in World War II, and now Dulles apparently believed that CIA, having become a new OSS, had to be cured of some of the problems that had affected its predecessor. To no one’s surprise, the Dulles-Jackson-Correa survey criticized Admiral Hill- enkoetter and recommended sweeping reforms. OPC and OSO should be merged. The DCI should wield more authority to coordinate intelligence, as General Vandenberg had proposed. The Office of Reports and Esti- mates (ORE), which had focused on briefing the President and only infor- mally coordinated its analysis with other departments, should be divided into a current intelligence section and a small staff of experts to write truly national intelligence estimates. The NSC adopted these recommen- dations almost in toto in a new directive, NSC 50, given to DCI Hillen- koetter in July 1949.
Confronted by such criticism and the daunting task of implementing the reforms required by NSC 50, Hillenkoetter temporized while waiting for the White House to appoint his successor. President Truman, however, postponed this step for a year. Hillenkoetter had done nothing egregiously wrong, and he had kept open the CIA’s lines to the Oval Office and the NSC. The real problem, however, was finding Hillenkoetter’s replace- ment. According to Sidney Souers, the President was loath to appoint anyone recommended by his new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson,
“ Wisee:, Memorandum for the Director of Central
—— of Central Inselligence, p. 42.
et Cymer te S| by 1908, Domes 3; Hews, Meme
“Approval by the NSC of Much of the Dulles Repos,” iz
>! A tT atte ae
whom he despised. At the same time, the recently appointed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, felt it inappropriate to offer any names of his own without a specific reyuest from the White House.*’ Meanwhile, the Agency continued to drift. Only Frank Wisner’s energetic but loosely organized OPC was laying ambitious plans at this point; the Office was fairly brimming with ideas for exploiting the Tito-Stalin disput’ and using “counterpart” funds from the Marshall Plan to strengthen leftwing but anti-Communist leaders and intellectuals in Western Europe.“
Events in Asia soon forced the CIA to reform. By the end of 1949 China had fallen to the Communists and Stalin had his own atomic bomb.® In April 1950 the National Security Council issued NSC 68, which reexam- ined America’s strategic objectives in the dim light of the Cold War and painted the global Lattle between freedom and tyranny in apocalyptic terms:
The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and iz the context of
the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat every where.
Frustrating the Kremlin’s designs meant shifting from the defensive to “a vigorous politica) offensive against the Soviet Union.” ® NSC 68 spurred OPC to new efforts as soon as the draft directive was circulated in April 1950.*' It nevertheless took Communist North Korea’s invasion of its southern neighbor in June 1950 to cnergize Washington, prompt widespread assent to NSC 68, and provoke major changes at CIA. With America again at war and the threat of a wider, perhaps worldwide, conflict apparently looming, OPC’s budget expanded dramatically and
active economic, political, and even military actions. CIA’s failure to provide better warning of the Korean invasion made it impossible for the White House to delay Admiral Hillenkoetter’s replacement any
“ According to Admiral Souers, in the President's 1948 campaign someone had promised Louis Johnson his choice of Cabinet posts in return for taking the apperently thankless post of campaign finance chairman. by this deal, Truman nonetheless felt bouad by it when Johnson insisted on becoming of Defense in the place of the ailing James Forrestal. Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Centr-' Intelligence, pp. 47, $3-54; Henhoeffer and Hanrahan, “Notes on the Early DCis,” p. 32.
“ See, for example, F nance Division to Executive, OPC (Wisner), “CIA Responsibility SS ee 17 October 1949, Docu-
ment 5)
for Soviet Control of a Communist China” 15 April 1949, Docu- an Sntee non Bffect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Eo abs on the Security sre Snty Come NAC, 14 Ap 190, Pg atin the United nas tnt 3a ae Koma er Bas Deaf Pay Pa m for the Record, “Policy Guidance,” 19 April
ORE 29-49,
longer.*? Even before the invasion, President Truman had decided— apparently on the advice of his aide Averell Harriman—that Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, US Army, would be the next Director of Central Intelligence. Smith did not want the job at first, but after war broke out he finally accepted the appointment. Confirmed by the Senate in late August, his prolonged convalescence from surgery prevented him from taking office until October.
Althoug’: Smith had little experience in intelligence, he had been well briefed and arrived at CIA with the determination and mandate to reshape the organization and make it work as a team. He had been General Eisen- hower’s chief of staff during the war and had afterward succeeded Averell Harriman as Ambassador to Moscow, spending three years in Russia observing the Soviets at close hand. Taking NSC 50 as his blueprint, Smith brought William Jackson aboard as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to carry out almost all of the NSC’s recommendations.* Small in stature but possessed of a keen inteliect and a sharp tongue (his temper was only worsened by lingering side effects of his recent opera- tion), Smith ruled the Agency with an iron hand, impatiently hazing even his most senior lieutenants but inspiring a strong sense of loyalty and drive in virtually everyone who worked with him.
One of Smith’s first steps was to break up the drifting Office of Reports and Estimates into three new offices, one for estimates, one for current intelligence, the last for reports.** His new Office of National Estimates (ONE) was a small group of scholars and senior officials exempted from potentially distracting administrative duties and directed to concentrate on writing estimates that could win governmentwide assent. The new DCi also transformed the ORE reporting section into the more efficient Office of Current Intelligence, which soon began publishing a new Cur- rent Intelligence Bulletin in the place of the old Daily Summary. The remainder of ORE became the Office of Research and Reports (ORR).
® CIA did not provide adequate tactical warning of the North Korean attack in 1950, al- though in early 1949 it had predicted that the planned “withdrawal of US forces frum Korea in the spring of 1949 would probably in time be followed by an invasion”; see ORE 3- 49, “Con- -\1yapchanehatie enema: iehamnstee ste eget lateral at ment $1.
® Smith hed suffered for years from ulcers, and his doctors finally resolved the coadition by removing much of his stomach in the summer of 1950. Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central 55-56.
S Smith initially did not want to meage O80 and OPC, according to Ludwell Montague: General Walser Bedell Smith as Director af Central Intelligence, p. 219. For an example of the
papers seen by the general, see Houston to Walter B. Smith, 29 August 1950, Docu-
5 ORB had alweys hed trouble : from other offices and agencies. some | “romet of Kay Pron fr OR
At Smith’s direction, Frank Wisner informed the Departments of State and Defense that OPC would henceforth be subject to the DCI as a regu- lar oftice of the CIA.* This step, combined with a “geographic-area divi- sion” system of organization and a more exacting process for reviewing proposed operations—both of which had been instituted in the summer of 1950—allowed Wisner to ensure that OPC’s rapid expansion over the next two years never got completely out of hand.
Allen Dulles joined the Agency in early 1951 as its first Deputy Director for Plans, charged with supe:vising OSO and OPC. With Dulles aboard, the idea of merging the two uffices steadily gained ground, despite the qualms of DCI Smith and some officers in OSO.*’
The war in Asia created an enormous demand for analysis and new covert operations.* In response, CIA’s budget and work force grew almost expo- nentially, to the point that Agency and Congressional officials were forced to find new wiys to hide allocations for the Agency in published reports on the budget.” The new covert operations themselves were becoming more sophisticated and daring: some even used American vol- untary organizations such as the National Student Association as (some- times unwitting) agents of influence with foreign anti-Communist leaders and groups.©
In just three years, covert action had become the most expensive and
bureaucratically prominent of CIA’s missions.“ The growing predomi- nance of the covert action mission evea began to affect the Agency’s
intelligence product. For example, Frank Wisner’s Speciai Assistant for Latin America, J. C. King, bypassed the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates to send to the White House his own
5* Wisner, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, “Interpretation of NSC 10/2 and Related Matters,” 12 October 1950, Document 64.
5” Smith wanted to maintain a clear distinction between clandestine collection and covert action, according to Montague, and also hoped the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take over OPC's large goerrilla operations in East Asia. Dulles, on the other hand, was joined in his advocacy of an OSO-OPC merger by ADPC Frank Wisner and ADSO Willard Wyman, although more then a few OSO officers lor red on OPC as an upstart and did not want to memge with it. Moo- tague; General Walter Bedell Smith as Director af Central intelligence, pp. 219-226.
5 For examples of CLA anatysis of the Korean war, see Smith, Memorandum for the Presi- Gent, 12 October 1950, Document 65; NIE 12, “Consequences of the Early Employment of Chinese Nationalist Forces in Korea,” December 1950, Document 66. rt Memorandum for the Record, “CIA Appropriations,” 25 October 1951,
© Milos W. Buffington to CSP [Lewis S. Theanpson), “United States National Seudent As- sociation,” 17 February 1951, Document 67; Wieser to Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Ceieis in the American Committee for Cultural Preedom,” 7 April
a Men at
estimate of the deteriorating situation in Guatemala.** DCI Smith com- plained more than once that covert action, particularly in support of the analysis of intelligence; at one staff meeting he caustically wondered aloud whether CIA would continue as an intelligence agency or become the administration’s “cold war department.” © He asked the NSC for a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CLA operations, and in October 1951 the Council responded with NSC 10/5, which endorsed the Agency’s anti-Communist campaign and further expanded its authority over guerrilla operations. Smith reluctantly went along with NSC 10/5 and the proposed merger of OPC and OSO, which took place 1 August 1952. Indeed, under DCI Smith the major functions of the Agency were consolidated in three directorates: plans, intelligence, and administration. These three directorates, along with a fourth created in the 1960s, today are the main pillars of the Agency's institutional structure.
The military and diplomatic quagmire in Korea had its effects on the Tru- man administration as well as on CIA. After Truman sacked Gen. Doug- las MacArthur in April 1951, the Korean frontline stabilized and both sides dug in for a static war of attrition. To the end of his administration, there was almost no good news from Korea for the President. Truman s popularity sagged as casualties mounted, the peace talks dragged un, and Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy savaged the administration for being soft on Communism. Truman more than once considered using atomic bombs to break the Korean stalemate. DCI Smith feit some of the weight on Truman’s shoulders when he briefed the President on Fri- day mornings. The President usually wanted to talk about Korea, using the general’s comments on the course of the fighting to assess the advice he received from the Pentagon. Smith prepared carefully for these meet- ings, keeping abreast of CIA activities but working even harder to make his battle maps more precise than JCS Ciairman Omar Bradley's.”
By the time the Truman administration (and DCI Smith) prepared to leave office in iate 1952, the CIA was a very different institution from what it had been only a few years earlier. The world itself was changing.
© Berman, Memorandum for Rear Admiral Robert L. Dennison, “Estimate of Situation in Guaiemala,” 14 January 1952, Document 76. en Sates Seana, 25 Cenc P| Gecemens Ta and 37 Ceecber 1968 @ee-
ument 80). “ National Security Council, NSC 10/5, 23 Oceober 1951, Document 73; Smith tw CIA
a 53 w 103, es leat ut hrs eld oe Decree
Simon & Schester, 1992), pp. 872-873. as Dinctor of Cahtral Intelligence, pp. 232-233.
Reinvigorated by the Marshall Plan and American security guarantees, Western Europe appeared much less vulnerable to internal subversion.“ Joseph Stalin was dying. The Cold War itself had reached its first pause, as the stalemate in Korea dragged on and the Soviets pondered how they could exploit the rising calls for national liberation among the West's aging colonial empires.” The CIA’s own focus, especially in the field of covert action, was already shifting to the Third World as well.
When President Truman came to the Agency to say fareweil and thanks in late November 1952, he told the assembled CIA men and women that the United States now had an intelligence agency that was “nct infericr to any in the world.” The CIA was vital to the presidency, Truman declared, because America had been forced to take up the burden of world leadership that it should have assumed after the First World War:
We are at the top, and the leader of the free world—something that we did
not anticipate, something that we did not want, but something that has been forced on us... . It is our duty, under Heaven, to continue that leadership in the manner that will prevent a third world war— which would mean the end of civilization.
President Truman explained that President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower would soon be making decisions daily that would affect millions of peo- ple. As he assumed the most powerful office in the history of the world, he would need the stream of inielligence that the Central Intelligence Agency sent daily to the President’s desk.”
With President Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, the CIA entered a new phase. Now the Agency would have its first civilian Direc- tor—Allen Dulles, who had unprecedented access to the White House and to the Secretary of State, his brother Jchn Foster Dulles. As the Agency focused on Communism as the main disruptive element in world affairs, anti-Communist covert action attained an importance among the CIA’s missions that it would not again approach until the 1980s. Dulles’s long tenure of almost nine years as Di ector had its own, far-reaching effects on CIA, but the decisions reached during the Truman administra- tion and the changes imposed by DCI Smith circumscribed the scope of later directors’ actions. It is worth understanding that experience as CIA, iui @ New postwar pericd, faces hard choices on many of the issues that were first debated and decided in the Truman administration more than 40
years ago.
* Far a CLA view of Western Burope, see DCI staff meeting minutes, 21 November 1951, Document 75. Also see Betimate 13, “Probable Developments in the World Situation
Stead anes w 1951, Document 71. e Botimate 9, lemediate Developments in the Far East Following a Fail- are in the Cease-Pire Negotiations ia Korea,” 1951, Document 70.
™ See President Truman's farewell speech to CIA, 21 November 1952, Documeat 81.
Sources and Deciassification
This third volume in CIA’s Cold War Records series provides an over- view of the Agency’s early development by presenting some key docu- ments—especially those that received the President’s personal attention— that guided its formation and work during the Truman administration. In selecting CIA-related documents from the Truman years, we have sought to balance considerations of novelty, space, and relevance. In recent years CIA has declassified many of its early records. Although a few of this volume’s early documents have been published in other works, most of its previously declassified documents were either released to individual researchers under Freedom of Information Act requests or transferred without publication to the National Archives under the auspices of the Agency’s Historical Review Program. The newly declassified records are variegated, although most of them were created within CIA, usually for internal distribution. They range from memorandums for the record sum- marizing senior officials’ policy debates to working-level reports and communications; the former show how the CIA supported the Truman administration’s foreign policies, while the latter offer insight into the
Agency’s day-to-day workings. We should add that since 1985 the CIA History Staff has actively helped
the Historian’s Office of the Department of State compile two supplemen- _—
tary volumes on “Intelligence and United States Foreign Policy, 1945- 1950” for the Foreign Relations of the United States series. These two
volumes (one a microfiche companion volume) will include almost 1,300 documents from State, CIA, the NSC. and elsewhere, which were still classified when the Foreign Reiations volumes for this immediate post- war period were published some years ago. These forthcoming supple- mentary Foreign Relations volumes, which the Department of State expects to publish within the next year, will include about 20 docu- ments—mainly from the 1945-47 period—that we reproduce in this present work.
Are there any surprises in this volume’s newly declassified records? Some, perhaps, although most of them will no doubt confirm long-held views of the Agency’s early years, such as its turf wars, its drift under Admiral Hillenkoetter, its under Walter Bedell Smith, and the
anti-Communist activism of Frank Wisner’s Office of Policy Coordina- Govtespuntns & Gib CD-OPC inks Ge patey puitanne CLA pet fer
valry, the policy guidance CIA got for appetite for CLA intel-
————— eo ll UCU
The documents have been organized in three generally chronological sec- tions. Part I, covering the two years between the dissolution of the war- time Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in October 1945 to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1947, shows the bureaucratic and policy debates surrounding the birth and growth of the interdepartmental Central Intelligence Group (CIG). These early documents, most of which have been declassified for some time, help explain how CIG developed into the new statutory CIA. Part II, cov- ering the three years from CIA’s September 1947 founding to General Smith’s arrival as DCI in October 1950, chronicles Hillenkoetter’s rud- derless Agency and Frank Wisner’s activist OPC and describes the early analysis that CIA provided to the White House. Part III, from mid-1950 to the end of 1952, focuses on new forms of intelligence analysis and covert action while detailing the genesis and consequences of DCI Smith’s reforms.
This volume also includes a glossary of abbreviations, brief identifica- tions of persons mentioned in the documents, and a chronology of events in the almost eight years of President Truman’s administration. A few of the newly declassified documents have had some words or passages deleted to protect intelligence sources and methods—in bureaucratic jar- gon, they have been “sanitized.” Limitations in space have led us to print other documents (clearly noted as excerpts) only in part. In shortening documents for publication, we have tried to excise only such sections as appendixes that are not essential to understanding the thrust of the docu- ment. In any event, these newly declassified records, including those por- tions omitted for space reasons in this volume, will be transferred to the National Archives and opened for research.
The documents we have reproduced in this volume vary greatly in their physical condition. Some are typed or printed originals, but others we have found only in faint carbon, Mimeograph, or Ditto copies of the time, or in Thermofax or photocopies made later on.”’ When we have been unable to find a signed original copy, we have searched for a clean, con- temporary carbon, or a typed true copy—a common practice in those pre- photocopy days. Sometimes, however, we have only a poor copy to work with, and its reproduction in this volume is barely legible. For a few doc- uments, for want of the original in any form, we have reproduced a typed transcription prepared in the early 1950s for Dr. Arthur B. Darling, the CIA's first historian. When we reproduce a document that is nut a signed _— -_ 2. CCC
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Assistant Director for Special Operations (CIG and CIA) Bureau of the Budget
Central Intelligence Group
Chief, Special Projects Division, Office of Policy Coordination Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (CIG and CIA)
Deputy Directorate of Administration, or Deputy Director for Adminis- tration
Deputy Directorate of Intelligence, or Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Directorate of Plans, or Deputy Director for Plans Department of Defense
Publications Division, Office of Reports and Estimates
Economic Cooperation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Advisory Board (interdepartmental)
Intelligence Advisory Committee (interdepartmental)
National Intelligence Authority (interdepartmental)
National Intelligence Estimate |
National Security Council
] *
28269888892
Office of National Estimates
Office of Policy Coordination
Office of Reports and Estimates (CIG and CIA) Office of Special Operations (CIG and CIA) Office of Special Projects
Office of Strategic Services Psychological Strategy Board (interdepartmental) Special Assistant to the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination Special Estimate
Special Procedures Group, OSO
Strategic Services Unit, War Department
Note: All offices and position titles are CIA unless otherwise indicated. The terms Assistant Director and Deputy Director refer to the men who headed their respective offices.
Persons Mentioned ”
King of Jordan from 1921, assassinated 20 July 1951.
Under Secretary of State, August 1945-June 1947; Secretary of State from 21 January 1949.
President of Guatemala, from November 1950. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, July 1945-October 1951.
Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, CIG and CIA, July 1947- November 1950.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1947-49.
General of the Army, US Army; Chief of Staff, US Army, February 1948—August 1949; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from August 1949.
Senator (R-NH), from 1937. Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, from 1948 to 1952. Secretary of State, 3 July 1945-21 January 1947.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; SSU, CIG, and CIA; Office of Special Operations, CIG and CIA, to 1948.
Naval Aide to the President, to July 1946; Special Counsel to the Presi- dent, 1946-50.
President of the Nationalist government of China to January 1949, and again from March 1950 (Taiwan).
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to July 1945, then again from October 1951.
Member, National Security Council Survey Committee, 1948. 7 Organizations, titles, and ranks held during the Truman administration, 1945-53.
Earman, John S.
Eberstadt, Ferdinand
Eddy, William A.
Edgar, Donald
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Elsey, George M.
Forrestal, James V.
Central Intelligence Agency Historian, 1952-54; Author, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990).
Naval Aide to the President, 1948-53.
Governor of New York; Republican nominee for President, 1944 and 1948.
Director, Office of Strategic Services, to 1 October 1945.
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, CIG, 2 March 1946-11 July 1946; Director, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, January 1951-July 1952.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Chairman, National Security Council Survey Committee, 1948; Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 4 Jan- uary 1951-23 August 1951; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, from 23 August 1951.
Secretary to the National Intelligence Authority, 1947; Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, from 1947; Executive Assistant to the DCI, from January 1952.
Investment banker, New York; prepared the Eberstadt Report on service unification for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, 1945.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Special Assistant to the Secre- tary of State for Intelligence and Research, 1946-47.
Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, CIG and CIA, July 1946—October 1947.
General of the Army, US Army; Supreme Commander, Allied Expedi- tionary Forces, Europe, World War II; Chief of Staff, US Army, Novem- ber 1945-February 1948; President, Columbia University, 1948-50; Supreme Allied Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1950- 52; President-elect, 4 November 1952-20 January 1953.
Assistant Naval Aide to the President, 1945-46; Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President, 1947-49.
Secretary of the Navy, to 17 September 1947; Secretury of Defense, 17 September 1947-28 March 1949.
Foskett, James H. Galloway, Donald H.
Harriman, W. Averell
Harvey, George Helms, Richard M.
Hilger, Gustav Hillenkoetter, Roscoe
Hoover, J. Edgar Houston, Lawrence
Huddle, J. Klahr
Hulick, Charles V.
Irwin, S. Leroy
Jackson, William H.
Johnson, Louis
Rear Admiral, US Navy; Nava! Aide to the President, July 1946—Febru- ary 1948.
Colonel, US Army; Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIG and CIA, 11 July 1946-27 December 1948.
Ambassador to the USSR, to January 1946; US Representative to Europe under the Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-50; Special Assis- tant to the President, 1950-51; Director for Mutual Security, from Octo- ber 1951.
Staff member, House Appropriations Committee, from 1946.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; SSU, CIG, and CIA; Deputy Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, December 1951—August 1952; Acting Chief of Operations, DDP, from August 1952.
German diplomat and Soviet expert, World War II; Consultant to the US Government on Soviet affairs.
Rear Admiral, US Navy; Director of Central Intelligence, CIG and CIA, 1 May 1947-7 October 1950.
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Assistant General Counsel, OSS, 1944-45; CIG and CIA General Coun- sel, from 1946.
Assistant Director for Research and Evaluation (changed to Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates in late 1946), CIG, September 1946- May 1947.
Executive Assistant to the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (later for the Deputy Director for Plans), CIA, from 1949.
Major General, US Army; Interim Activities Director, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1945-46.
Member, National Security Council Survey Committee, 1948; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 7 October 1950-23 August 1951; Special Assistant and Senior Consultant to the Director of Central Intelligence, from August 1951.
Secretary of Defense, 28 March 1949-19 September 1950.
a a eEEEe el tt
Johnston, Kilbourne
Joyce, Robert P.
Kennan, George F.
Kent, Sherman
Kim Il-Song
King, J. Caldwell
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.
Langer, William L.
Lay, James S.
Colonel, US Army; Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, December 1950—August 1951; Assistant Director for Policy Coordi- nation, 23 August 1951-1 August 1952.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Office of Special Operations (CIG) liaison to the Department of State, 1946—June 1947; Political Adviser, Trieste, 1947-48; Senior Consultant (representing the Secretary of State), OPC, from September 1948; Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from December 1948.
Chargé d’ Affaires, US Embassy Moscow, January 1945-April 1946; Deputy for Foreign Affairs, National War College, August 1946—July 1947; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, May 1947- December 1949; Counselor for the Department of State, August 1949- July 1951; Ambassador to the USSR, May 1952-September 1952.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Professor of History, Yale University; Vice Chairman, Board of National Estimates, CIA, Novem- ber 1950—-January 1952; Chairman, Board of National Estimates, from January 1952.
Leader of the Korean Communist Party and (from May 1948) Premier of North Korea.
Special Assistant to the DDP for Latin America, CIA, December 1951- March 1952; Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, OPC, and Directorate of Plans, CIA, from March 1952.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; SSU, CIG, and CIA; Execu- tive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, November 1950- June 1951; Deputy Assistant Director for Special Operations, July 1951- December 1951; Assistant Director for Special Operations from
17 December 1951.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Professor of History, Harvard University; Chairman, Board of National Estimates, CIA, November 1950-January 1952.
Central Intelligence Group, from January 1946; Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Board, January 1946-September 1947; Office of Reports and Estimates, CIG, 1947; Assistant to the Executive Secretary, National
Security Council, September 1947-January 1950; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from January 1950.
oe th et ee ee ee it,
Leahy, William D.
Lovett, Robert A.
MacArthur, Douglas
Magruder, John
Mao Tse-tung
Marsna:!, George C.
Mossadeq, Mohammed Murphy, Charies S.
Nehru, Jawahariai
Fleet Admiral, US Navy; Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (Pres- idents Roosevelt and Truman); presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1942—March 1949.
Assistant Secretary of War for Air, to December 1945; Under Secretary of State, July 1947-January 1949; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Septem-
ber 1950—September 1951; Secretary of Defense, from 17 September 1951.
General of the Army, US Army; Commander, US Armed Forces in the Far East, to April 1951.
Brigadier General, US Army; Deputy Director for Intelligence, OSS, to September 1945; Director, Strategic Services Unit, War Department,
1 October 1945-4 April 1946; Senior Consultant (representing the Secre- tary of Defense), OPC, from September 1948.
Leader of the Chinese Communist Party and (from October 1949) Chair- man of China’s centrai government council.
General of the Army, US Army; Chief of Staff, US Army, to November
1945; Secretary of State, 21 January 1947-20 January 1949; Secretary of Defense, 21 September 1950-12 September 1951.
Department of State, Washington, to July 1947; Deputy Under Secretary of State, from July 1950.
Assistant Secretary of War, to November 1945; US High Commissioner for Germany, June 1949-July 1952.
Chief, Central Reports Staff, CIG, March-July 1946; Acting Assistant Director, CIG, 1946; Office of Reports and Estimates, September 1946— November 1950; ” CIA representative to the NSC, September 1947- October 1950; Office of National Estimates, from November 1950; Author, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).
Premier of Iran, from April 1951.
Administrative Assistant to the President, 1947-50; Special Counsel to the President, from 1950.
Premier of India, from August 1947.
7 The Office of Reports and Estimates was originally named the Office of Research and Eval- uation; the title was changed in November 1946.
Offie, Carmel
Patterson, Robert P. Petersen, Howard C. Pforzheimer, Walter Rhee, Syngman Roosevelt, Franklin D. Ruddock, Merritt K.
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.
Schwartz, Arthur H. Smith, Russell Jack
Smith, Walter B.
Souers, Sidney W.
Steve. — Leslie C.
Special Assistant to the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, 1948-50.
Secretary of War, 27 September 1945-18 July 1947.
Assistant Secretary of War, 1945-47.
CIG and CIA Legislative Counsel, from 1946.
President of South Korea, from August 1948.
President of the United States to 12 April 1945.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Central Reports Staff, CIG, 1946; Office of Reports and Estimates, CIG and CIA, 1946-48; Deputy Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, September, 1948- November 1949.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Professor of History, Harvard University; American Committee for Cultural Freedom, from 1951.
New York attorney and state Republican Party chief, 1948.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Office of Reports and Esti- mates, CIA, June 1947—November 1950; Office of National Estimates, from November 1950.
Lieutenant General, US Army; Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Europe, World War I]; Ambassador to the USSR, April 1946-December 1948; Director of Central Intelligence from 7 October 1950.
Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve; Director of Central Intelligence, CIG, 22 January 1946-10 June 1946; Executive Secretary, National Security Council, August 1947—January 1950; Special Consultant to the Presi- dent, from January 1950.
Premier of the Soviet Union and leader of the Soviet Communist Party from the 1920s until his death on 5 March 1953.
Rear Admiral, US Navy; Senior Consultant (representing the Joint Chiefs), OPC, from September 1949.
/_
Chief, Special Projects Division, OPC, 1950-51; Office of the Deputy Director for Administration, CIA, from 1952.
Tito, Josip Broz
Truman, Harry S.
Yugoslav Premier, Defense Minister, and leader of the Yugoslav Commu- nist Party from 1945.
President of the United S:ates, 12 April 1945-20 January 1953.
Vandenberg, Arthur H. Senator (K-MI), 1928-51; President pro tem of the Senate and Chairman,
Vandenberg, Hoyt S.
Wisner, Frank G.
Wright, Edwin K.
Wyman, Willard G.
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1947-49.
Lieutenant General, US Army Air Forces; member, Intelligence Advi- sory Board, January 1946-May 1947; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli- gence, US Army, 1946; Director of Central Intelligence, CIG, 10 June 1946-1 May 1947.
Office of Strategic Services, World War II; Deputy to the Assistant Secre- tary of State for the Occupied Areas, 1947-48; Assistant Director for Pol- icy Coordination, CIA, 1 September 1948-23 August 1951; Deputy Director for Plans from 23 August 1951.
Colonel, US Army; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, CIG and CIA, 20 January 1947-9 March 1949
Major General, US Army; Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIA, 15 February 1951-17 December 1951.
12 April
17 July
14 August
15 February
President Franklin D. Roosevelt dies in Warm Springs, Georgia; Vice President Harry S. Truman takes the oath of office as President.
Germany surrenders.
The Potsdam Conference of the leaders of the United States, Great Brit- ain, and the Soviet Union convenes to discuss peace terms and the fate of Germany.
Atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima, Japan.
Japan accepts Allied peace terms.
World War II ends as Japan formally surrenders.
Executive Order 9621 dissolves OSS, effective 1 October. The Research
and Analysis Branch is transferred to the Department of State; the espio- nage and counterintelligence branches become the Strategic Services Unit under the War Department.
RAdm. Sidney Souers the first Director of Central Intelligence.
CIG’s first Daily Summary is dclivered to the President.
Kingman Douglass becomes the first Deputy Director of Central Intelli- gence.
Winston Churchill delivers his “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, MO.
A three-year civil war breaks out in Greece; the Soviet Union supports Communist guerrillas there through Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, US Army Air Forces, is sworn in as the second Director of Central Intelligence.
The Office of Special Operations is constituted under Donald Galloway ax the first Assistant Director for Special Operations. Schedules are drawn up for merging SSU into CIG.
17 July
19 July
23 July 28 July
15 September .
20 October
5 November
19 November
1947
19 January
20 January
12 March
11 April 1 May
30 May 5 June
7 July
DCI Vandenberg argues for an independent budget for CIG at a meeting of the National Intelligence Authority; the Authority agrees to help him get one.
The Office of Research and Evaluation (renamed Reports and Estimates in November 1946) begins operations.
ORE 1 analyzes Soviet foreign and military policy for President Truman. CIG formally takes control of the FBI’s Latin American operations. Communist-dominated Bulgaria is proclaimed a people’s republic.
SSU field personnel are transferred to the CIG’s Office of Special Opera- tions (OSO).
Congressional elections result in firm Republican majorities in both Hous<s.
Romanian voters endorse the Communist-dominated government after a campaign of violence against the non-Communist opposition.
Polish Communists win a huge parliamentary majority in elections that the United Kingdom and the United States declare to be in violation of the Yalta agreement.
Col. Edwin K. Wright replaces Kingman Douglass as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. :
In a message to Congress, President Truman announces the Truman Doc- trine of aid to nations threatened by Communism.
SSU headquarters personnel are transferred to OSO.
RAdm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter is sworn in as the third Director of Cen- tral Intelligence.
A Communist-led coup renders Hungary a Soviet satellite.
Secretary of State Marshall, speaking at Harvarc, . .iis for a European
Moscow rejects the Marshall Pian.
26 July
18 September
5 October
15 December
17 December
1948 12 February
19 June
President Truman signs the National Security Act of 1947, which pro- vides for a National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.
The Central Intelligence Group becomes the Central Intelligence Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.
The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) holds its founding meeting in Belgrade.
DCI Hillenkoetter submits a draft of the Ceriral Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to the Bureau of the Budget.
In NSC 4-A, the National Security Council authorizes CIA to conduct covert “psychological warfare.”
National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 7 authorizes CIA to collect foreign intelligence fiom American citizens with overseas contacts.
A Soviet-led coup in Czechoslovakia destroys that country’s remaining anti-Communist leadership; concern mounts in Washington that the Com- munists might make big gains in the forthcoming Italian elections. Congress approves the Marshall Plan.
Rioting outside the Organization of American States meeting in Bogota, Colombia, endangers Secretary of State Marshall, prompting criticism of CIA in Washington.
Italy’s new Christian Democratic Party wins a sweeping victory in national ele-cions.
The Sovict Union defies the United Nations and establishes a people's republic in North Korea.
Israel becomes an independent state. NSC 10/2 (which rescinds NSC 4-A) expands CIA’s authority to conduct
covert action and gives a supervisory role to the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Congress reinstates the draft.
24 June
28 June 1 September
2 November
1949
January
22 January 4 April 12 May 20 June
29 June
7 July
21 July
5 August 10 August
23 September
1 October
Berlin blockade; Soviet authorities cut electricity and halt all land and
The Soviet-controlled Cominform denounces Tito and expels Yugoslavia.
The Office of Policy Coordination, CIA, formally begins operations under Frank Wisner.
President Truman wins a stunning reelection victory over Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, and Democrats regain majority control of both Houses of Congress.
Allen Dulles, Wiiliam Jackson, and Matthias Correa submit their survey of CIA to the National Security Council; the report criticizes DCI Hillenkoetter.
Beijing, the capital of China, falls to the Communists. The North Atlantic Treaty is signed. The Soviets tacitly concede defeat and officially lift the Berlin blockade.
President Truman signs the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which specifies the powers and authority of the Director of Central Intel- ligence.
US occupation forces complete their withdrawal from South Korea.
The National Security Council approves NSC 50, which directs DCI Hill- enkoetter to make significant reforms in CIA as outlined in the Dulles- Jackson-Correa report.
The Senate ratifies the North Atlantic Treaty, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The United States halts aid to China’s Nationalist government.
President Truman signs a bill creating the Department of Defense and expanding the powers of the Secretary of Defense.
President Truman announces that the Soviet Union has successfully tested an atomic bomb.
The People’s Republic of China is proclaimed in Beijing.
15 May
25 June
5 August 15 September
7 October
13 November
26 November
16 December
Chinese Nationalist government is established on Taiwan.
President Truman authorizes development of a hydrogen bomb.
President Truman submits the draft of NSC 68 (prepared under the super- vision of the Secretaries of State and Defense) to the National Security Council and other departments for comments and estimates of its poten- tial cost. The draft advocates a large military buildup and a political and ideological counteroffensive against the Soviet Union.
State Department officials advise OPC to draft new and more ambitious plans in expectation of formal approval of NSC 68.
A reorganization of the Office of Policy Coordination consolidates its sections into geographic-area divisions, laying the foundation for the
future structure of the Directorate of Plans. Communist North Korea invades South Kcrea; American forces engage
two days later.
UN forces in South Korea are penned within the Pusan perimeter.
General MacArthur’s landing at Inchon shocks the North Korean Army; UN forces break out of Pusan and begin racing toward the Chinese bor-
der.
Lt. Gen. Walter B. Smith is sworn in as the fourth Director of Central Intelligence. William H. Jackson becomes Deputy Director for Central
Intelligence.
The Office of Reperts and Estimates is dissolved and superseded by
three new offices: the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of Cur- rent Intelligence, and the Office of National Estimates.
In a large-scale intervention, Communist Chinese forces strike the flank of MacArthur's advance into North Korea. MacArthur is forced to retreat.
Korean war setbacks prompt President Truman to proclaim a state of
national emergency, which places CIA and other agencies on a six-day workweek.
1951 4 January 15 January
25 January
11 April
23 June
1 July
23 August
23 October 12 November
1 January 1 August 24 September
Allen Dulles assumes the new post of Deputy Director for Plans.
The Office of Current Intelligence begins operations, publishing its all- source Current Intelligence Bulletin.
Communist forces led by Chinese troops reach their farthest southern advance since their counteroffensive began in November. Allied forces begin to push them slowly northward.
President Truman relieves General MacArthur as commander of US forces in Korea.
Premier Mohammed Mossadeq nationalizes Iran’s oil industry.
DCI Smith asks the NSC for a ruling on the scope and pace of CIA covert
operations.
British Secret Intelligence Service officers and suspected spies Guy Bur- gess and Donald Maclean flee Great Britain to defect to the Soviet Union.
Korean truce talks open. The battlefront stabilizes and there is little change in the frontline until the end of the war.
The Soviet Union’s Ambassador to the United Nations tables a Korean cease-fire proposal. Negotiations begin at Kaesong soon afterward but proceed at a snail’s pace and finally break down altogether in August. DCI Walter Bedell Smith is promoted to General, US Army.
Allen Dulles succeeds William Jackson as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Frank Wisner is promoted to Deputy Director for Plans.
NSC 10/5 expands CIA’s authority to conduct covert action.
New cease-fire talks begin at Panmunjon, Korea, after a series of UN attacks.
Loftus Becker becomes the first Deputy Director for Intelligence.
OPC and OSO are merged under Deputy Director for Plans Frank Wisner.
Iran rejects Anglo-American oil settlement.
21 November
The stalled armistice talks at Panmunjon break off as the Communists await the results of the American elections.
The United States successfully tests its first H-bomb.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower defeats Democrat Adlai Stevenson to win election as President of the United States.
President Truman says farewell to CIA in a speech to the Agency’s employee’.
Harry Truman leaves office as President of the United States.
Walter Bedell Smith resigns as DCI and retires from the US Army to become Under Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration.
Part I: From OSS to CIA
The documents in Part I run from the last days of OSS in 1945 to the debate in 1947 that led to the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency.
During World War II America developed a capable intelligence arm—the Office of Strategic Services—that was not part of any department or military service. Its Director, William Donovan, was not alone in arguing that the nation needed something like OSS after the war. Disagreeing, President Truman dissolved OSS soon after Japan’s surrender, gave several OSS units to the State and War Departments, and asked State to take the lead in forming a new interdepartmen- tal organization to coordinate intelligence information for the President. After several months of bureaucratic wrangling, Truman stepped in to establish a small Central Intelligence Group (CIG) principally to summarize each day’s cables for the White House. The fledgling CIG had powerful friends, however, and a politically astute chief, RAdm. Sidney Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence. Within a few months CIG agreed to adopt the Strategic Services Unit—the former OSS espionage and counterintelligence staffs that the War Department had absorbed. By mid- 1947, the acquisition of SSU and the maneu- vering of an aggressive new Director, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, had built CIG into the nation’s foremost intelligence organization, which Congress soon provided with a legislative mandate and new name—the Central Intelligence Agency—in the National Security Act of July 1947.
1. William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President 13 September 1945 (Photocopy)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. Cc. |
-* 4 September 1945
LEKORANDUL FOR THE PRESIDENT:
1. I unierstand that it has been, or will be, suggested to you that certain of the eetsnat functions ef this organization, more particulerly, secret intelli- gence, counter-espionage, and the evaluation end synthesis
of intellisence -- that these functions be severed and
transferred to serarate acencies. I hope that in the natjonal interest, end in your own interest es the Chief Executive, that you ill not permit this to be dom.
2. ‘hhatever agency hes the duty of intellizence should heve it as a complete whole. To do otherwise would be to add chaos. to existing confusion in the intelligeme field. The various functions that’ have
been integrated ere the essential funetiqns in ma intelligeme. One-is dependent” upon the other. of ;
SE eS = <—_f oe
2. William D. Leahy, Memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, “Establishment of a central inte!ligence ser- vice upon liquidation of OSS,” 19 September 1945 (Photocopy)
CY4¥799 &D THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF :
19 September 1945.
MEXOXANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AR: / SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
Subject: Establishment of a central intelligence service upon
licuidation of S45
The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy forward the attached memorandum to the President.
nm For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
Enclosure.
(Continued)
wa ENCLOSURE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
A memorandum from the Director of Strategic Services on the establishment of « central, intelligence service was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 November 1944 for their comment and recommendaticn. The matter received careful study and consideration at that time end the Joint Chiefs of Staff were prepared to recommend, when opportune, the establishment of such an agency in three steps, namely:
1. An Executive Order setting up a National Intelli- gence Authority, (composed of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (appointed by the President), and an Intelligence Advisory Board (heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies).
2. Preparation and submission to the Fresident by the above grcup of a basic orgenizational plan for es- tablishing the complete intelligence systen.
3. Establishing of this intelligence system by Fresidential directive and legislative action as ap- propriate.
Sincetheir first studies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff neve had referred to them a letter from the Director of Strategic Services to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, dated 25 August 1945, renewing his proposals on the subject. Meanwhile, the cessation of hostilities, certain undecided questions regarding the future organization of the military establishment, and the development of new weapons present new factors which require consideration.
The end of hostilities. has tended to emphasize the importance of proceeding without further delay to set up & central intelligence systen.
The unsettled question as to post-war military or- ganization does not materially affect the matter, and certainly varrants no further delay since a central in- telligence agency can be fitted to whatever organizatiou or establishments are decided upon.
-l- Enclosure
Recent developments in the fielc of new weapons have advanced the question of an efficient intelligence service to a position of importance, vital to the security of the nation in e degree never attained and never contemplated in the past. It is now entirely possible thatfeilure to provide such a system might bring national disaster.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize, as does the Director of Strategic Services, the desirability of:
: a. Furthsr coordination of intelligence activities , related to the national security; ,
b. The unification of such activities of common con- cern as can be more efficiently conducted by a common agency; and
c. The synthesis of departmental intelligence on the ° strategic and national policy level.
They consider that these three functions may well be more effectively carried on in a common intelligence agency, provided that suitable conditions of responsibility to the departments primarily concerned with national security are maintained. They believe, however, that the specific pro- posals made by the Director of Strategic Services are open to serious objection in that, without adequate compensating advantages, they would over-centralize the national intel- ligence service and place it at such a high level that it would control the operations of departmental intelligence agencies without responsibility, either individually or collectively, to the heads of the departments concerned.
In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff append hereto en alternative draft directive, which they believe retains the merits of General Donovan's proposals, while obviating the objection thereto.
The success of the proposed organization will depend largely on the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he should have considerable permanence in office, anéd to that end should be either a specially qualified civilian or an Army or Wavy officer of appropriate background and experience who can be assigned for the requisite period of time. It is considered absolutely essential, particularly in the case of the first director, thut he be in a position to exer- cise impartial judgment in the many difficult problems of orgenization and cooperation which must be solved before an effective working organization can be established.
-2- Enclosure
APPENDIX
: DRAFT
DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In order to provide for the development and coordina- tion of intelligence activities related to the national security:
. 1. A National Intelligence Authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and @ representa- tive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is hereby established and charged with responsibility for such over-all intelligence planning and development, and such inspection and coordina- tion of all Federal intelligence ectivities, as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
e] related to the national security.
2. To assist it in that task the National Intelligence Authority shall establish a Central Intelligence Agency headed by a Director who shall be appointed or removed by the President on the recommendation of the Nationa .Intel- ligence Authority. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority and shall sit as a non-voting member thereof.
3. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consist of the heads of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies heving functions related to the national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
4, The first duty of the National er Authofity, assistec by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Advisory Board, shall be to prepare and submit to the President for his approval a basic organiza- tional plan for implementing this directive in accordance with the concept set forth in the following paragraphs.
This plan should include drafts of all necessary legislation.
“ms
(Continued)
5. Subject to the direction and control of the National enoty sooner Authority, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:
~~. we eT
a. Accomplish the synthesis of departmental intel- ligence relating to the national security and the é>“ropriate dissemination within the government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.
b. Plan for the coordination of the activities of all
intelligence agencies of the government having functions related to the national security, and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of departmental intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished by @ common agency, including the direct procurement of intelligence.
ad. Perform such other functions.and duties related to intelligence as the National Intelligence Authority may from time to time direct.
’ 6. The Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police 4 or law enforcement functions.
7. Subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority, the existing intelligence agencies of the govern- ment shell continue to collect, evaluate, synthesize, and disseminate departmental operating intelligence, herein defined as that intelligence required by the several depart- ments and independent agencies for the performance of their “" troper functions. Such departmental operating intelligence , ai. des ted by the National Intelligence Authority shall be freely available to the Central Intelligence Agency for synthesis. As approved by the fational Intelligence Author- ily, the operations of the departmental intelligence agencies 8/02 be open to inspection by the Central Inte —— fgency in connection with its planning function. the interpretation of this pereerepn: the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Inte ence Agency will be res ible for fully protecting intelligence sources and me which, due to their nature, have a direct and highly important bearing on military operations.
-4- Appendix
the National Intelligence Authority shall the departments participating in the National thority in amount and proportions to be
the members of the Authority. Within the limits of the funds made available to him, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may employ necessary person- nel and make provision for necessary supplies, facilities, and services. With the approval of the National Intelligence Authority, he may call upon departments and independent agencies to furnish such specialists as may be required for supervisory and functional positions in the Central Intel- ligence Agency, including the assignment of military and naval personnel.
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omy 27-DEC 1945 Subject: Central Intelligence 4gency. 1. As you have requested, I am attaching: (a). Copy of the State Department Plex. (b) of draft of directive proposed by the Joint : of Steff. (c) Detailed comparison of Plans (a) and (b). 2. Ditferen--« between the two plans are fer greater, end
more fundemental, then ey appear to be on the surface.
3. Mr. MoCormack, author of the State Department plan, ed- vooates thet the Secretary of State should contro) 4merica's intelli- qiee ettere, The Secretary of State or his representative, Hr. ue-
feels, should determine the character of the intellizencs fur- nished the President. He made this point clear not only in his pub- lished plen, but also in his talk to the public over the radio, end in various addresses to Arny end Keval officers intended to sell the State
t plen.
4. There are three serious objections to Ur. McCornack's pro- posal:
(a) Recent experience has shown al) too clearly thet as lons es the 4rny exd Mavy may be called upom in the
-2- te ane
. tr emt a,
tected thes under the McCormack plen for the following reasons:
(a) the Authority would be set up under the President, end therefore on « level higher then thet of eny siape tasnt. 4s & result, no me department
unduly the type of inte pro- duced. re, wore balanced control could be expected, as no single department would be dominant. —
(>) ‘the President would appoint the Director, aaking it possible to procure « man of outstanding ebility end integrity.
(c) *hrough the pooling of expert personne) in the Central Intelligence 4gency, many functions now performed by werious intelligence agencies could be cerried out more efficiently, expeditiously, end economically than could be expected under the licCormack plen. (lr. KeCormack has indicated in interviews that he is not in favor of & central intelligence agency. )
(4) he JCS Plan provides for the preparation of summaries and estimates approved by the participating egencies for the use of thore who need them sost: the President, those on « Cabinet level responsible for advising the President, end the Joint Plemers. "
(e) The JCS Plan contemplates a full partnership between the three departments, crested and operated in the spirit of free consideration, end with « feeling of a full share of responsibility for its success. The whole-heerted cooperstian of participa agencies would be aseured inasmuch as the Central Intelligence Agency is desimed to operate cn a reciprocal basis,
6. *he JCS Plan has the further adven of having been under eomsideration for many months. It was prepared long consideration —
25-
‘ ae ~ Subject: Central Intelligence Agency. _ EO. 11008, Sen, 300 end 05) i oa we ewe ee Cee e wee ee wee w ew wee ee ee ee ~~ mane oon
8. As you know, my interest in this subject is wholly objec- tive es I om not « candidate for the job of Director mé couldn't accept
even if it were offered me. | ree
6 John Magruder, Memorandum for Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, : “Assets of SSU for Peacetime Intelligence Procurement,” 15 January 1946 (Carbon copy)
15 January 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR: Maj. Gen. 6&. Leroy Irwin SUBJECT: Assets of - for Peace-time Intelligence
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and handling clandestine foreign
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8 procuring
f persennel.
screening, tives, agen and
tary,
tine C, sociological and scientifie
Clandestine mili evaluating, precessing and such rts oat to'tbere tn Sesnlagtns
3e
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tegether with detailed interrogations of thes — cemcerning that knowledge.
4e The most comprehensive bibliography in the United States of the literature of espionage.
» certain relaticas were of such neutral eountries, as Switserland, Sweden, Spain and Turkey.
that taseeding te their principles ean enlp'be maintad oun
_ << e ‘ ¥ ; ot See ee hAas 3 4 are . \e “4 ” } ie ¥ Pa oe oe Bea Pe nd Ph ba fa . ' Agha in trem Let 0 i ‘ Pr aeaees cee ee é * om 6 - a ve Pe hod ele 4 ef i Sys: FS he a am > 6% pale) oc &S \ 5 | he 4,4 Sia Bes =e él et ety S38, afi go9 4 he . POINTE Nt RRR ge SS ASS htt
33
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Staf: studies are now in process for leng-tera ereseees say Saepenn agg Fae suse be isplemen coun coun since restoration ef certain normal tions 18 essential to the estab- liehment and maintenance of successful cover.
- Zoe X-2 Branch is in the unique position ef opera American counter-espiomage er tion with coordinated coverage in both military
tary areas outside of the Western Hemisphere.
> al . ~ > ’ ' ‘ . ; oo
¥
-5- -i-
whieh they wish made known to the United States dovern- ment end which might otherwize not reach American sources.
X-2 has developed a staff of specialists
against foreign intelligence and sabotage organizations assist in the interrogation of captured enemy agents and intelligence officials, relevant captured enemy documents. I-2 ts the work of CIC in security matters of local interest, and receives CIC intelligence ef broader than local °
| In non-military areas, X-2 personnel generally operate in Btate Departaent diplomatic and consular offices gerecsieee’ 22 Serer countries in Burepe and the Near
te hw sentatives serve Anserican poten ¢ Service Officers with advice and assistance on security ae penetration by foreign intelligence services, and
th security checks on native employees, ey for United States visas or other individuals with when the officers are in touch. They also seiatain appropriate pe PR with local counter-int<iligence and police
| Washington X-2 headwuarters are the central opera center and cellec point for all information sent in by the field stations representatives. Here exists a central file of information om over 400,000 individuals whe are in one form or another connected with
te le
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i
ais 13
aH
ai
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(Continued)
Te °
Lf =
am 2 -7T- aT matter of continuous record and the relative wer. is for
in e work of vuriou. personality traits und
sttribu nave been analysed for guidance in future recruiting. These records, assessment methods, and trained personnel remain a significant &8U asset.
agents uot only in Wasbington but in the ? remains with &S0 or is to en large extent recoverable.
Security officers have been on duty with a Gee, ESS
g —- - i i -_”
ing coordinated at Washington headquarters the
8 of security within the agency nave been high
pees my te the varied nature of the ts ‘ fune and stations of duty. These s re
7,
Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January
1946 (Photocopy)
ab POA, PUR soe Fy tee A a ~ Sie = ~ * Y p TS ne RE - a ¥ Sa ee 46- 1951 17007,
THE WHITE HOUSE
oem ep soe HINGTON od ae Se UASINNS TO
lL. IS is my deaire, and I hereby direst, thet all Federal foreign
intelligence activities be planned, developed end ccordinated so as to
assure the most effective acccuplishment of the intelligence nissian
related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together vith
another person to be named by ue as my porecnal representative, as the
vy
Mational Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpess.
eo 2, Within the limits of available apprepristions, you shall cosh
Suen tine to tino assign pesoens end fesilitics fm ypyr respective
Dapertnente, which percens chal) ecllectively fen © Cedtvel IotAiiguase QGreup end shall, under the direction ef a Direster of Central Intelligenss, aecigt the National Intelligence Authority. The Direster of Central In- telligesss shall be designated by ms, diall be responsible to the Neticenal
Tatelligense Authority, and shall rit as 8 now-veting member thereof.
Se Subject te the existing lew, and to the direction and contre) Cf the Hetienal Intelligences Authority, the Direster of Central Intelli-
| genes challs a. Ascmplich the ecreletion end evalusticn of intelligence seleting to the anticnal socusity, and the
ary»
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence.
Im eo Going, full use shall be asde of the staff and
facilities of the intelligesce agenties of your Depart- aente.
b. Plans for the coordination of such ef the activi- thes of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate to the ational security and recummend to the Ihn- tional Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the acst effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. | ' . Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, each services of common concern as the Matioral Intelligence Authority determines can bs ore efficiently ecoemplished centrally.
4. Perform such other functions and duties related te intelligence affecting the asticnsl security as tke Presiddat aad the Mational Intelligence Authority my froa
time to tine direst.
be Be pelice, lew enforcement or isterml security functions ehall be euerciced under tunis direstive.
Se Such intelligence rescived by the intelligences agenstics of your Departasate es aay be desiguated by the Mational Intelligence authority chal) be frealy eveilabie to the Direster ef Central Intelli-~
gence for correlation, evaluation or disseninstion. fo the extent approved by the National Intelligence Authority, the operations of
enié intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Directer of Central Intelligence in comestion with planning functions.
: . 6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments
shall centime to ecllest, evaluste, correlete and dissexinate depertam- tal intelligence.
7. The Direster of Central Intelligence shall be advised by am Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their repre- sentatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Goverment having functions releted to national security, as Gotermined ty the National Intelligence Authority.
GS, Within the scope of existing lus and Presidential directives, other departnentes and agencies of the executive branch of the Federal Goverment shall furmish sach intelligence information relating to the national scsurity es is in their possession, and as the Direstor of Central Intelligence may fran tine to tine request pursuant to regule- tions of the National Intelligence Anthority.
9. Mothing herein shall be construed to authorise the making ef investigations inside the continental limite ef the United States and ite possessions, except as provided by lew end Presidential éLrectives. |
w~. Za the contast of thes estivitics the Sstiens) Istelli~ (rave Anthertty and the Director of Contea) Intelligence shall be reepenaihie for fully protecting iatelliganss sourves sad asthots.
Sincerely yours,
& National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the National Inielli- gence Authority’s 2nd Mecting, 8 February 1946
COPY BO.
Director of Central Inteliigenc: Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group
é
(
ted adéing the words “contain-
word “summaries”.
i ; F | 3
ly fectusl sumecries
therefore recommended deletion
Be ané weekly” in paragraph 4-3. TEE RATIONAL IVTELLIGESCE AUTHORITY: 5.1.4, 2 sub theset
of thes
Gistribution shown in
ional
tioned whether dai ient. t to rewording of paragraph 4 to as follows: a "a. Pro@uction of daily summaries statements of the Authority, and edéit
veuffiets enciosure
revordéing of the
the enclosure to
of M>. MoCormack's office
ow
ané within the
23
-
a]
5 of the the limites funde and by arrange - ehévieory Board. pervonnel —
Pursuant to the attached letter from the Fresident, dated 22 Januery 1346. designating the undvrsigned as the Nations] — Intelligence Ac ‘nority, you are hereby directed to perform your mission, as Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance vith the folloving policies and procedures:
1. The Ceritral Intelligence Group shall be considered,
| organized and operated as e cooperative interdcpartaentel ectivit7, with adequate and equitable participction by the State, Wer and Navy Departments and, cs recommended by you cnd approved by us other Pederal depertments and agencies. The Army Air Porces will be represented on a basis similar to thet of the
Aray and the Hevy. |
2. The Central Intelligence Group vill furnish stretegic and national policy intelligence to the Fresident and the State, Wer and Nevy Depertments, and, as appropriate, to the Stete-War- Favy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ctne governmente] depertments end agencies having strategic end polig functions releted to the national security.
3. The composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board vill be flexible and vill depend, in each instance, upon the subject matter unger consideration. The 8; cial Assistant to tpe Sesretary of State in charge of Research and Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff 0-2, MPOS, tye Chief of Heval Intelli- @enee and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (or their representatives) vill be permanent members. You vill
-li-
invite the head (or bis representative) of any other intelligence agency having functions related to the nations] security to sit as & member on all astters within the province of his. sgeacy.
’ “f All recommendations, prior to submission to this authority, "1 will be referred to the Board for concurrence or comment. Any a recommendation which you and the Intelligence Aévisory Boerd ep- | a _ prove unanimously and have the existing authority to execute acy
be put into effect without ection by this Authority. If any member of the Board does not concur, you will submit to this Authority the basis for bis non-concurrence at the same time that you subsit your recommenéation.
4. Recommendations approved by this Authority vill, vhere applicable, govern the intelligence ectivities of the separete Gepartments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Boerd vill each be responsible for ensuring that epprov- ed recommendations are executed vithi. their respective depert- ments.
5. You will submit to this Authority as soon as practicable a proposal for the orgenizstion ofthe Central Intelligence Group
: $ and an estimate of the personnel and funds required from each
4 department by this Group for the balence of this fiscal year
| and for the next fiscal year. Each year thereafter prior to
, the preparation of departmentel budgets, you vill submit e
‘= similar estimate for the following fiscal ye*r. fs approved by $ PA. this Authority ané vithin the limits cf available appropriations, 4% the necessary funds and persotinel vill be sede available to | you by errangezent between you end the appropriate department through ite member on the Intelligence Advisory Board. You : ray determine the qualifications of personnel and the adequacy , a: of individual candidates. Personné] assigned to you vill be 4y | under your opvrationsl end efministretive dontrel, subject only ; . «$$ Mecesaary personnel procedures in each éepartuent. i. ic sa | 4
‘Mia DIR 1
é F 6. The Central Intelligence Group will utilise ell availeble intelligence in progucing strategic and national policy intel-. Agence. /11 intelligence reports prepared by ths Central Intel- Agence Group will note any substantial dissent by a participat- ing intelligence agency.
7. As required in the performance of your authorized mission, there will be mate eveilable to you or your author‘sed represen- tatives all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of our respective departments. Arrangements to carry this out will be made with members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Conversely, 211 facilities of the Central Intelligence Group end all intelligence prepared by it will be- made available to us and, through arrangements egreed betveen you and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, subject to any authorised restrictions, to our respective depertucnts.
8. The operations of the intelligence agencies of our Gepartments vill be open to inspection by you or your authorised representatives in connection vith yourplenning functions, under arrangements agreed to betveen you end the respective members of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
9. You are ruthorised to request of other Pederal departacnts and agencies any information or assistance required by you in the performance of your huthorised mission.
10. You will be responsible for furnishing, from the personne) | Of the Central Intelligence Group, « Secretariat for this Authority, vith the functions of preparing agenda, reviewing and Cireulating papers for consideration, attending ell meetings, | Keeping and publishing minutes, initiating ané revieving the implementation of decisions, end performing other necessary
Secretary. of State “or bid Secretary of the Navy
16, Central Intelligence Group; “Daily Summary,” 15 February 1946 (Ditto copy) )
a 4ue os 6 SA! GENERAL l. Secret Yalta and Tehran for Sale in Paris--The gris Embassy 3 andthe USSR at Yalta and Tehran have been offered for sale in ‘Paris by agents of ‘‘some Russians in Switzerland, and ihai a French and e Swiss spaper are con- sidering their publication. Ambassador Caffery has some of these “agreements ‘there are said to be eleven.of them), about which he reports the following: 9 ;
a. In one Tehran “agreement” the US promised to supply the USSR with a $10 billion credit in return for a Soviet commitment to support our pro- posals for fac :litating worid trade, fair distribution of raw materials, and the regulation of international currency. :
b. In one Yalta “‘agreement’’, allegedly signed by Hopkins and Molotov, the US recognized a Soviet claim of free access to the Mediterranean in return for a Soviet agreement (1) to recognize the absolute independence of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, k umania, Bulgaria and Yugoslayia and (2) to renounce any agreements with those countries giving the Soviets a pre- ferred position. ,
_ ¢ Another Yalta ‘‘agreement’’ covered the Soviet use of German
‘In addition, the Embassy reports that these agents are also said to
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ae
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4. GERMANY: Discontinuance of relief for ced in US Zone--Tne Wer ; announce the discontinuance of relief oy | july for all displaced persons in the US Zone in Germany. An exception will be made, however, for those persons who are unwilling to be repatriated because of possible persecution on the grounds of race, religion, etc. Those desiring repatriation will be moved out by 1 July.
$. TURKEY: USSR to wait for solution of Turkish ‘ lem’’--In con- versation ore , asre Ankara, Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov has stated that “‘we waited a long time regarding the arrangement we wanted with Poland and finally got it; we can walt regarding Turkey.”’ He said that for a reestablishment of friendly relations between the two countries, a solution of the USSR’s claims regard-
S
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
cory wo. 5
7 June 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
~
SUBJECT: Progress Report on the Central Intel e
The Central Intelligence Group was officially acti-
vated on 8 February 1946 pursuant to the approval of N.I.A. Di- rective Ho. 2. Actually, & small group of personnel from the State, War, end Navy- Departments had been assembled beginning on 25 January, three days after the President signed the letter. directing the establishment of the National Intelligence Au- thority. 2. ORGANIZATION
| The Central Intelligence Group has been organized in accordance with N.I.A. Directive No 2. The major components at the present time are the Centre) Planning Staff, charged vith planning the coordination of intelligence activities, and the Central Reports Staff, responsible for the production of na- tional policy intelligence. A Chief of Operational Services, with @ small staff, has been designated as «@ nucleus from vhich @n organization to perform services of common concem may be built. A small Secretariat to serve the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board, has been created. The Administrative Division | Consists of an Administrative Officer, « Security Officer, « Personnel Officer, and © small group of treined personnel to Provide necessary administrative services for the Centre) Intel-
att ¥ or aghig 5 ti
‘ : ee 4 4 . ; ra a cw, 0 itt Py woe . Mee * r “ et) wh gi > “ x “3 Poy . oe oe 3 ar) ho, <a ee "i a “a 4 7 * i “f * ot at a bv. ey ; re RS.” 1 * : s.. e » a qm a7 : i ?
7 i i
il.
Tor-secne> 3- PERSONNEL | Personnel ‘for C.I.G. has been requested and selected on the principle that only the most experienced individuals in each field of intelligence activity should be utilised in this vital preliminary period. The responsible officers in the De- partments have cooperated wholeheartedly toward this end. How- ever, the procurement of C.1.G. personnel has necessarily been @ rather slow process, in view of the demobilisation and the
fact that C.I.G. and departmental requirements for qualified
individuals naturally had to be reconciled in many specific cases. The present status of C.I.G. personnel is shown in the following tabulation:
TOTAL 1 = 43 199(13A) 79 | 16 3 | Tl 165 Accepted but not yet .
TOTAL la as 7 |) «643 | 265 $ cf Authorised | Xt, 4 lps — |. — | a —
# Includes Office of Director, Secretasiat, and Chief of Operational Services.
ninth," ~ authorised by NIA. Directive Ho, 2 ; "4" = Personnel assigned ty A-2 -2- yom. og
It may be seen that the organization of the Central Planning Staff has been given priority, since effective plan- ning is considered 8 necessary prelude to accomplishment of the C.I.G. mission. Concentration is now placed on manning the Central Reports Staff. ‘The need for filling positions in the Administrative Division has been largely allevizted by the part-time use of the personnel and facilities of the Stra- tegic Services Unit, although this Division will require re- inforcement vhen centralized operations are undertaken.
A development of great importance regarding person- nel bas been the designati.. of specially qualified consult- ants to the Director of Centrel Intelligence. An outstanding scientist with wide intelligence experiance, Dr. H. PF. | Robertson, is Senior Scientific Consultant to the Director. arrengements are well advanced for the designation of Mr. George F. Kennan, recently Charge d'Affaires in Moscow and 6 | Poreign Service Officer with a distinguished career, as Spe- cial Consultant to the Director, particularly on U.8.3.R. af- fairs.
4. The activities of the Central Intelligence Group to
date have been characterised principally by the administrative details of organisation, the consideration of urgent problems, and the basic planning for ® sound future intelligence progres. Basic policies and procedures regarding the organisstion have been established. Urgent problems in the intelligence field,
especially as regards certain vital operations, have been carefully studied and appropriate action has been or is ready te be taken. Substantisl progress has been made in the enal- ysis of long-range intelligence problems. The throes of ini- tial organization and planning are, therefore, generally past, and the time for initiation of centralized intelligence oper- ations has now been reached.
tion of Inte e Activities. Beginning - on 12 February 1946, four days after the activation of C.1.G.,
the C.1.G. has been receiving numerous suggestions or recom- mendations for studies leading to the effective coordination of Federal intelligence activities. A number of other studies of this type have been initiated by C.I.G. These problems generally fall into three categories: (a) problems for which . partial but inadequate solutions were evolved during the var; (>) problems which existing Governmental machinery vas unable to solve or incapable of solving; and (c) problems which re- quired new solutions in the light of the post-hostilities sit- uation.
Some of these problems, particularly in the third category, require urgent interim solution. Among these prob- lems for vhich interim solutions have been evolved or initi- ated are the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit, the development of intelligence on the 0.5.8.R., and the coordins- tion of scientific intelligence. rt
Problems for which immediate solutions are vell ad-
vanced include the following:
&. Provision for monitoring press and prope- gande broadcasts of foreign povers.
- Provision for coordinating the soquisiticn of foreign publications.
¢. Coordination of collection of intelligence information.
a. Coordination of intelligence research. . Essential elements of information.
e f. Provision for collect fore intelligence information by clendest °
g: Intelligence on foreign industrial establish- ments.
h. Interim study of the collection of intel- ligence information in Chins.
i. Central Register of Intelligence Information. Projscts which are in various stages of study or
planning cover the following additional subjects:
&. Disposition of files of the U.S. Strategic Survey.
b. Censorship planning.
c. Intelligence terminology.
a. Resources potential prograz.
e. — of sampling eran to intel- £
&
Io
, Survey of cov of the fore language press in the Uni States. _
. ___alligence on foreign, petroleum gevelop- 2. Qoordination of geogrephical and related in-
s A = She 4, é
¥ a
telligence. ‘ . a 4 wi & ’ —:) ee ee aan < : a « oat , ae “a Li 2 tn ao Way ta bs tes Big. “ : he eae eT a ae a” - 5 Ps * Aad Ps = wh Wh # » ’ eo &e . - me? al ’ >, i
ty aa: +o Tae pea
il.
(Continued)
i. Disposition of the Publications Review Sub- committee of the Joint Intelligence Con- mittee.
j. Survey = the hens Intelligence Study Pub- lishing Board
k. Disposition of the pho phic intelligence file in the Department °f State.
1. Coordinated utilization of private reseerch in the social sciences.
m. Index of U.S. residents of foreign intelli- gence potential.
n. Exploitation of American business concerns with connections ebroed as sources of foreign intelligence information.
©. Planning for psychological verfare.
p- Utilization of the services of proposed minerals ettaches.
One of the functions of C.1.G. which has assumed great importance is the support of adequate budgets for Depart- mental intelligence. Coordinated representation to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress, of the budgetary requirezents for intelligence activities, promises to be one cf the most : effective means for guarding against arbitrary depletion of intelligence resources at the expense of nationa)] security.
So long as the C.1.G. is dependent upon the Departments for budgetary suppor:, however, its authority to speak as an un- ~ biased guardian of the national security will be suspect end therefore not wholly effective. ’
ant to H.I.A. Directive Ho. 2, the Central Reports Staff con-
‘ centrated on the production of « factual Deily Summary, the
11. (Continued)
POP -SEGRET—
the first issue of which was dated 13 February. Although this
Summary covered operational as well as intelligence matters
and involved no C.1I.G. interpretation, it has served to keep the C,I.G. personnel currently advised of developments and formed @ basis for consideration of future intelligence re- ports.
Despite the undermanned condition of the Central Re- ports Staff, the urgent need for @ Weekly Summary has resulted in the decision to produce the first issue-on 14 June. Until adequately staffed in all geographic areas, however, this pub- lication will concentrate on those areas for which quelified personnel is now available. The concept of this Weekly Sun- mary is that it should concentrate on significant trends of events supplementing the normal intelligence produced by the Depertments. Procedures are being developed to ensure that the items contained therein reflect the best ju‘gment of qual- ified personnel in C.1I.G. and the Departments.
The primary function of C.I.G. in the production of intelligence, however, will be the preparation and dissemina- tion of definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions — of foreign countries as they affect the national security of
the United States. The necessity of assigning the best quali- fied and cerefully selected personnel to this vitel task has delayed its initietion. Solution of the relationship of this C.1.%. activity to the Departments, the State-War-Navy Coordi- ting Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Steff, and other agencies concerned with the national security, has also been deferred
-1- ToP-suoner-
POP-SECREP
pending the procurement of adequate personnel. This procure- ment has now been given priority, and it is anticipated tnat the Centrel Reports Steff will be prepared to produce national
policy intelligence at an early date.
Performance of Centralized Operational Services. The
operation of central services by the C.I.G. has been considered to be a subject requiring careful study to ensure that Depart- mental operations are not impeded or unnecessarily duplicated. The urgent need for central direction of the activities and liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit was recognized by the N.I eA. and an arrangement was effected whereby this Unit is operated by the War Department under directives from the | Director of Central Intelligence. This arrangement temporarily provided C.I.G. with facilities for direct collection of re- guired information but is admittedly only a stop-gep measure. C.I.G. planning and organization has now progressed to the point where firm recommendations may be made for C,.1.G operation of intelligence services which can be more efficient- ly accomplished centrally. Among those operations under con- © sideration as C.1.G. activities are:
&. Monitoring press and propagande broadcasts of foreign powers.
b. Collection of foreign intelligence informa- tion by clandestine methods.
c. Production of static intelligence studies
of foreign areas, to replace Joint Army- Navy Intelligence Studies. (JANIS). .
-8- OP Renae
—_—— |
. Establishment of a Central Register of In- telligence Information.
|Q
Basic research and analysis of intelligence subjects of common interest to ell Depart- ments, such as economics, geogrephy, sociol- Ogy, biographical date, etc.
In the consideration of performance by C.1I.G. of cen- tral operations, however, the ecministrative, budgetary and legel difficulties of the present organization have presented real probiems. The reduction of Departmental funds and person- nel for intelligence activities have made it difficult for De- partments, despite their desire to cooperate, to furnish the necessary facilities to C.J.G. The inability of C.1I.G. to re- cruit personnel directly from civilian life, and the adminis-
trative complications of procuring personnel from the Depart- ments, are likely to jeopardize effective conduct of C.1.G. operations. The lack of enabling legislation making the C.1.G. a legal entity has made it impossible to negotiate contracts which are required for many operations, such 4s the monitoring of foreign broadcasts.
5. CONCLUSIONS @. The present organizational relationship between the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Intelligence Advisory Board is sound.
b. The initial organizational and planning phase of C.1.G. activities has been completed and the operation of centralized intelligence services should be undertaken by
C.I.G, at the earliest practicable date.
-9- | ToP-SRORET
POP-SEGCRBE-
C nenetinel
c. The National Intelligence Authority and the Cen- tral Intelligence Group should obtain’ enabling legislation and an independent budget as soon as possible, either as part of @ new national defense organization or as @ separate agency, in order that (1) urgently needed central intelligence oper- ations may be effectively and efficiently conducted by the Central Intelligence Groun, and (2) the National Intelligence Authority ané the Central Intelligence Group will have the necessary suthor.ty and standing to develop, support, co- ordinate and direct an adequate Federal intelligence program
for the national security.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS ? Director
(1002) ie ae POP-SEOREP
12. George M. Elsey, Memorandum for the Record, 17 July 1946
(Photocopy)
17 July 1946
_ On 16 July Er. Clifford met Mr. Huston and Mr. Lay froa the Central Intelligence Group, in :is office and discussed ui th thea a proposed bill for the establishment of the Central Intel- ligence Agency. Comnancer Fisey was also present.
Tne basis of the discussion was the craft bill which had been submitted by General Vandenberg to Mr. Clifford for comment, and Mr. Clifford's memorandum in reply of 12 July 1946.
@ govermem agmcy. Mr. Clifford also remrked that the Presidert had intended that his letter of 22 Jamary 1946 wuld provide a workable plan for the Central
Intelligence Group. Zr. Clifford than asked if experience had shown that _the plan outlined in the President's letter was not workable.
Mr. Huston and Mr, Lay ciscussed at eome length the administrative difficulties which the Central Intelligasce
Intelligence Group should becomes an operating agency with « large staff of Intelligence experts. _— :
ee oe
12.
(Continued)
-_
mencrandms of 12 July. Mr. Huston and Mr. Lay agreed tint all of Mr. Clifferd's points were. sell taken and they agreed to rewrite the bill incorpurati: z his suggestions. |
It was apparent during thf bemgbay part of the
discussion that neither Mr. Huston nor Mr. Lay had given much thought to the words which they had wed in drafting the bill.
Intelligence. In their hasty preparation of the draft in this
. scicsors-ant-feste method, they bad felled to grasp the essential
point that the Bational Intelligence Autuority should be a plamiing group and the Central Intelligence agency an opersting group.
Mr. Clifford pointed out to them the ~robeble opposition
“which & proposed bill would arouse if great care ani thought were
not given to the choice of w. te used,
ir. Mecten cit in Lag ail) prepare © uew W422 end sent it to Mr. Clifford fer comment.
°,
-
$$ re | . —-~
Ke Oy
GEORGE HM. ELSEY
13. National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA’s 4th Meeting, 17 July 1946
See cory no, °4 NI.A. 4th Meeting
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212 Department of State Building
on Wednesday, 17 July 1946, at 10:30 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Secretary of Stete Jamer F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patte.*son
Acting Secretary the Navy John L. Sullivan
Fleet Admiral Will: D. Leahy, Personsi Representative af the President
Lt. General Hoyt S.. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence
ALSO, PREGENT °
Dr. William L. Lenger, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Stale for Research and Intelligence Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State Colenel Charles W. McCarthy, USA Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, Nationsl Intelligence Authority
This document has been epproved for rela°3: thessect the mssoarcen ROVE T? prrts 3
the Cautzsi Intelligence inc
te (tf2f 92
ERP “2
, 00CG.8C
Deuassrien to SecesT
55
(Continued)
pa :
1. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SECRETARY BYRNES asked Generel Vendenberg to give the members a report on present and future matters concerning the Ventral Intelligerce Group.
GENERAL VANDENBERG invited attention to the conclusions contained in the "Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Group" by Admiral Souers, former Director of Central intelligence. Generel Vandenberg explained that at the present time each intelligence agency is working along the lines of primary interest to its department. It is his belief that C.1.G. should find out what raw material received by one department is of interest to the others. In order to do this, C.1.%. must be in 6 pusition to see and screen 4ll rew material received.
For exemple, eos regards & given steel plant, State is studying" whet: products ere wade there ani the rate of production. War Department, however, is interested in the construction and physical details of the plant, the railroads serving it, and other data required for target information. State Department, if it broadened the base of its studies, might well be able
to furnish at least part of that type of economic intelligence. It is the job of C.1I.G., therefore, to find out the needs of all the departments and to meet them, either by recommending thet one department expand its activities or by performing the neces- sary research in C.I1.G. In order to do this, an sdequate and cepable staff is urgently required in C.I.G. It is extrezely difficult administratively to procure the necessary personnel] under the present arrangement. General Vandenberg therefore feels that he must have his own funds and be able to hire people. This means that C.I.G. must be set up as an agency by enabling legislation.
SECRETARY BYRNES expressed the understanding that the N.I.A. was intentionally established ez it is in an effort to avoid the necessity for an independent budget.
SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed, and explained that this was designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money being spent on central intelligence.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought that it would be difficult to explain to Congress the need for intelligence funds vithout jeopardizing security.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought thet such considerations should be balanced egainst the added administrative difficulties they caused. He expressed the belief that the important thing wes that the Central Intelligence Group should be an effective and efficient. organization.
ADMIRAL LBAHY said that it was always understood that C.1.G. eventually would broaden its scope. It was felt, however, that the Departments initially coulé contribute sufficient funds and personnel to get it started. He is about convinced that R.I.A. should now attempt to t its own appropriations. These appropriations, hovever, should be small, since the three — should continue to furnish the bulk -f the necessary
f.
SECRETARY PATTERSON thought that the administrative probleme could be worked out under the present errangements.
SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the major problem vas tc find a way for the departments to give C.1.G. the money it
(Continued)
mee :
SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that lic was perfectly willing o Girect Army intelligence to furmish the necessary funds = C.I.G. and then let the Director of Central Intelligence pick his own personnel with those funds. He opposed 4 separate. pone oy he does not want to expose these intelligence operations.
SECRETARY BYRNES agree¢ that ve could not afford to make such disclosures in this country.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed ow: thet each personnel sction must be handled at present by 100 people in each t. This means that knowledge of C.I.G. personnel is exposed to
300 people in the three departments. He feels that handling personnel actions vithin C.I.G. itself would improve security.
ADMIPAL LEAHY agreed thet it was undesirable that so many people in the departments should have knowledge of 0.1.G. He fs.s that if each department gave 0.1.G. funds, personnel actions could be taken by C.1.G. itself without expos ing then.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out thet this would still require defending three separate appropriations acts before the Senate and the House of Representatives.
DR. LANGER agree’ that the funds would have to be defended before the Congress in any case.
SECRETARY BYRNES recalled that meubers of Songress had offered to include the State Department intelligence budget under such terms as “investigations abroad" or as an edded amount in any other budget account. He felt that since Congress var epperently willing to do this, the funds might eesily be hidden in this manner within departmental budgets.
DR. LANGER thought that Admiral Leahy's suggestion woul? be very effective. It might be possible to give K.I.A. en independent t for the more overt activities, and hide
ether funds in tal appropriations. This vould serve as ideal —s —, covert activities. Moreover, he believed that an dation for C.1I.G. would make General
Teukalinae oho of more stfee ive in supporting departmental intelli- gence budgets.
ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that this problem must be approached very carefully. He believed that no one was better qualified to advise B.I.A. on this than Secretary Byrnes, vith his Congressional backgrounéd. Admiral Leahy stated that the Preri- Gent authorized him to make it clear that the President con-
Iatelligence
out the directives of the H.1.A. Admiral said there vere some indications that the Director of Central lligence, with the Intelligence Advisory Boaré, might tend to assum grosses control over intell activities than was intended.
rel Leahy reitereted the President holds the Cabinet officers on H.J.A. primarily responsible for coordination of intelligence activities.
SECRETARY SULLIVAN compared the Director of Central Intell to an ae vice ooo pocaens who carries out the ins tions ané policies of B.I.A.
ee ——— ee
(Continued)
> Fs
ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that with regard to « Bill to obtain an independent budget and status for H.I.A., the Presigent considers it insdviseble to ettempt to present such « bill before the present Congress. The President feels that there is mot enough time for the N.I.A. to give this question sufficient study. ‘The President feels, however, that « bill might be épafted and be unser gtuce Ww the N.I.A. with @ view to the possibility of presenting it to the next Congress. Admiral Leahy stated that in the meantime he felt that General Vandenberg should be given, so far as practicable, sll the assistance that he requires.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out thet C.I.G. is not an agency suthorized to disburse funds. Therefore even vith funds from the departments, it would require disbursing and authenticating officers in all three departments, plus the necessary accounting organization in C.I.G. He felt that this was requiring four fiscal operations where one should suffice.
ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and SECRETARY BYRWES agreed, that this might be taken care of by the vording of an approprie- tions ect.
DR. LANGER questioned this possibility unless C.1.G. was given status as 6 disbursing agency.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought this status could be given the agency by the President under the authority of the Emergency Powers Act.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he understocc that this solution was decided against because it t indicate that N.1.A. was a temporary expedient which would terminate with the end of the President's war povers.
SECRETARY BYRNES was sure that it could be done by the President under his reorganization authority and vithout reference to the Emergency Powers Act. Secretary Byrnes under took to talk with the Bureau of the Budget on this matter and report beck to the N.1I.A.
ADMIRAL LEAHY was convinced that C.I.G. must have funds fcr which it does not have to account in detail.
DR. LANGER questioned whether General Vandenberg was not more concerned over the cumbersome errangement for handling personnel actions in all three departments.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stressed the fact chat vithout money there could be no personnel actions. For example, he noted that the State Department does not have sufficient funds to pay personnel required for ©.1.G. Genera] Vandenberg agrees, hovever, that personne] actions were extremely difficult under present arrangements. For example, it takes an average of Sis weeks to obtain security clearance from the Departments, and he does not feel that he should employ anyone without such Clearance. General Vandenberg stressed the fact that his greatest interest was in getting C.1.G. into operation by what- ever means possible. He felt that time was of the essence Guring this criticel period.
SECRETARY BYRNES believed that che only way at present to
avoid the administrative difficulties was to arrange tr heave each department transfer the necessary funds to 0.1.G.
2200" -3-
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out the difficulty of obtaining funéds from the Departments. For example, although the State Department poquseses & about $330,000 for N.I.A., only $176, 000 is being made available. While he apprecisted the need of the State Department for the other funds, this case exemplified the fact that C.I.G. could never be certain of receiving the funds which it requested and defended unless they were appropriated directly to C.1I.G.
DR. LANGER believed that this situation would not recur in the future, but he ¢id agree that State's contribution to C.1.G. wes not adequate. He did not see, however, how this could be increased except through « deficiency bill.
SULLIVAN asked why edéditionsal funds might not
SECRETARY - be secured from the President's emergency fund
GERERAL VANDENBERG stated that total funds available to $-5.0- for the fiscal year 1947 were $12,000,000, which left
e@ shortage for effective tions gio, 000, 000. He asked whether it t be possible to obtein peruission to spend eveileble et an accelerated rate in anticipstion of the
submission of the deficiency bill.
SECRETARY BYRNES thought thet such permission could not be obtained. He noted that what Jeneral 5 csnnes tone stated was that C.1.G. had $12,000,000 and wanted 000, 900.
Dr. LANGER questioned whether any mechanism vas to be available for reviewing this proposed budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERO stated that he had the details aveilebdie. Be noted, however, hat comprehensive review meant that this information must be widely disclosed to personnel in three departments.
SECRETARY SULLIVAN felt that since the President's remarks indicated that he held N.I.A. responsible, they must know the details regarding any C.1.G. budget request.
At Secretary Byrnes' request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then made a brief report on C.I.G. activities. He noted that C.1.G. was taking over Poreign Brosdcast Intelligence Service an‘ 411 clandestine foreign intelligence activities. In eddition, however C.1I.G. is receiving daily requests to take over functions now being done by various State, War and Nevy OCoe- mittees. One example is the suggestion that C.1.G. centralize the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their security. Another example i8 the concernd the War Department about ex-
of information vith the British. The State-War-Navy c inat Committee has @ subcommittee covering this exchenge. but it handles only about 20 or 30 percent of the information actually exchanged. This subcommittee confines itself purely to secret matters, whereas the Army Air Forces believe that ®& central clearing house should be established vhere the ber- @@ining value of this information may aleo be taken into account.
DR. LANGER pointed out that the SWHOC subcommittee deciles only vith technics] military information. Ho feels, hovever, that the @m Gleo involves such matters as the transfer of non-militery information and the declassification of material. Unless these matters are centralized, each department will continue, as at present, going ite ovn way.
2 eee -4-
ea :
. GENERAL VANDENBED? r-porteé that he has already set uw an Office of Special Operations. He has also established an Inter- Gepartmental Coordinating and Planning Star:f, but only on o
skeleton basis because of his need for edditionsl] personel.
SECRETARY PATTERSON felt that all of General Vandenberg's present problems should be solved if the Secretary of State . can obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated his problems, briefly, vere that he needed money, the suthority to spend it, and the euthority to hire ané fire.
SECRETARY BYRNES felt there were really two problems: First, to find ways to handle the monsy now available, an’ second,
to get whatever edditional funédsa@e required. He thought it
be difficult to get additional funds fifteon days after the fiscal year hed begun. He questioned whether present funds should mot be sufficient since the understanding vas that C.I.¢. ene peemeeiy continuing fumctions which have been previously performed.
GENERAL VANDENBERG expleined that C.1.G. was now under-
oertein nev Fensticeb Gnd ales expanding some existing ones. In ansver to questions, General Vandenberg stated that he proposed to have about 1900 people in secret intelligence and & total of something less than 3000 in C.1.G. by the en’ of the fiscal year.
DR. LANGER stated that he agreed with almost everything that General Vandenberg had saic, but thet he was impressed vith the imposing size of the proposed organization. He thought there should be « definite review of the program before 4 request for an aéditional $10,000,000 is approved.
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed owt that there is «4 clear need for additional eppropriations for intelligence in view of changing conditions. During the war there were American forces 4ll over the vorlé who were procuring information and intelli- gence in connection with military operations. These operations vere not copsidered as intelligence activities, however, and the funds required for them were not charged to intelligence.
These operations are now shrinking rapidly. It is necessary, therefore, to have intell agents 411 over the world to get the same information Guring the wer was handed to
intelligence agencies on a silver platter.
SECRETARY PATTERSON agrved with this statement. He noted that in etch theater of operations G-2 activities were merely 6 part + a operstions and vere not considered to be pert of the intelligonoe organisation directed from Washington.
GENERAL VANDENBERG then discussed briefly his proposed organization chart for the Central Intelligence Group. He noted that there would be an Interdédepartmental Coordinat end Pi Steff to assist in the coordination of al]1 intell
activities related to th> national security. There w .1é be four offices to conduct ©.I.0. operations, namely, Special ee Collection, Research and Evaluation, and Dissemina- on.
. si»
After further discussion, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
b.
Hoteé Genetsl Vandenberg's report on the Central Intelligence Group.
Noved that the Secre*ary of State would discuss with the Bureau of the Budget the solution of the problems @entioned by General Vandenberg, and would report back to the Authority.
Hoteé the organization of the Central Intelligence
—— which General Vandenberg was planning to put into e ect.
14. Clifford to Leahy, 18 July 1946
(Typed copy) IE SEGREE- ) ) 4lo we ie c 2Qb-SBGKET .
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON July 18, 1916 :
My Gear Admiral Leahy:
The President has directed me io assemble for him certain facts and information regarding the Soviet Union. He has directed me to
obtain from the Central Intelligence Group estimates of the present and future foreign and military policies of the Soviet Union. I = : therefore writing to request that the National Intelligence Authority instruct the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare such estimates for submission to the President at the earliest practicable date.
It is also desired that the Central Intelligence Group prspare f Soviet broad-
Inasmuch as the President hopes that this information will be in his hands before the convening of the Peace Conference in Paris on 29 July 19h6, it is desixved that the reports I have requested be delivered to me pricr to that date,
Very truly yours,
/s/ Clark M. Clifford
Special Counsel t o the President
To: Director of Central Intelligence: —_ GP ree comply m4 + mater of rtority
— /o/ William L. Leahy C) GIA bes ap cljestion te dectess Gaief of Staff 0 © eeeteias informction of GA
—— pA QOrsEGRET—
authority:
1S.
CIG, Office of Research and Evaluation, ORE 1, “Soviet Foreign and Military Policy,” 23 July 1946
f
4 he
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
SOVIET FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY
pre TT ,
15.
(Continued)
ons “~ - lOc sieret
23 July 1946 _ COPY NO.
SOVIET FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY
SUMMARY
1. The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitasle conflict with the cap-
‘ italist world. It therefore seeks to increase its relsiive power by ouilding
up its own strength and undermining that of its assurca antagonists.
2. At the same time the Soviet Union needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period. It must therefore avoid provoking a strong reaction by a com- bination of major powers.
3. In any matter deemed essential to its security, Soviet policy will prove adamant. ‘In other matters it will prove grasping and opportunistic, but flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered.
4. The Soviet Union will insist on exclusive domination of Europe east of the general line Stettin-Trieste.
5. The Soviet Union will endeavor to extend its predominant influence to include all of Germany and Austria.
6. In the remainder of Europe the Soviet Union will seek to prevent the
' formation of regional blocs from which it is excluded and to influence national
policy through the political activities of local Communists.
7. The Soviet Unicr desires to include Greece, Turkey, and Iran in its security zone through the establishment of "friendly" governments in those countries. Local factors are favorable toward its designs, but the danger of provoking Great Britain end the United States in combination is a deterrent to
' @vert action.
8. The basic Soviet objective in the Par East is to prevent the use of China, Korea, or Japan as bases of attack on the Soviet Far East by gaining in each of those countries an influence at least equal to that of the United States.
9. The basic Soviet military policy is to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible hostile combination. On the completion of planned demobilization these forces will still number 4, 500.000 men.
10. Por the time being the Soviets will continue to rely primarily on large masses of ground troops. They have been impressed by Anglo-American strategic air power, however, and will seek to develop fighter defense and long senge bomber forces.
eer:
shu T ET
11. The Soviets will make a maximum «ffort to develop as quickly as pos- sible such special weapons as guided missiles and the atomic bomb.
12. Purther discussion of Soviet foreign policy is contained in Enclosure "a"; of Soviet military policy, in Enclosure “"B".
67
we woe
15. (Continued)
Oe a ee
1. Soviet foreign policy is determined, not by the interests or aspira- tions of the Russian people, but by tke prejudices and calculations of the inner directorate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. While the shrewdness, tactical cunning, and long-range forethought of this controlling group should not be minimized, its isolation within the Kremlin, ignorance of the outside world, and Marxist dogmatisa have significant influence on its ap- proach to problems in foreign relations.
2. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy may be world domination. Such a condition is contemplated as inevitable in Communist doctrine, albeit as a result of the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism, which Communist effort can only accelerate. In view, however, of such actual circumstances as the marked indisposition of democratic nations to adopt the Communist faith and the greatly inferior war potential of the Soviet Union in relation to them, that goal must be regarded by the most sanguine Communist as one remote and largely theoretical. While acknowledging no limit to the eventual power and expansion of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership is more practically con- cerned with the position of the U.&.&S.R. in the actual circumstances. +
8. Por the present and the indefinite future the fundamental thesis of Soviet foreign policy is the related proposition that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capitalist states is in the long run impossible. Consequent- E- ly the U.S.S.R. must be considered imperiled so long as it remains within an antagonistic “capitalist encirclement."* This concept, absurd in relation to so vast a country with such wealth of human and material resources and no powerful or aggressive neighbors, is not subject to rational disproof precise- ly because it is not the result of objective analysis. It is deeply rooted in a haunting sense of internal and external insecurity inherited from the Rus- sian past, is required by compelling internal necessity as a justification for the burdensome character of the Soviet police state and derives its authority from the doctrine of Marx and Lenin.
4. On the basis of this concept of ultimate inevitable conflict, it is the fundamental policy of the Soviet Union;
a- To build up the power of the Soviet state; to assure its inter- nal stability through the isolation of its citizens from foreign influ- ences and through the maintenance of strict police controls; to maintain armed forces stronger than those of any potential combination of foreign powers; and to develop as rapidly as possible a powerful and self-suffi- cient economy.
a
b. To seize every opportunity to expand the area of direct or in- direct Soviet control in order to provide additional protection for the vital areas of the Soviet Union.
* In this context socialism (as distinguished from communism) is considered
as antagonistic as capitalisa. ; 3
(Continued)
c-. To prevent any combination of foreign powers potentially inimical to the Soviet Union by insistence upon Soviet participation, with veto power, in any international section affecting Soviet interests, by dis-— couraging through intimidation the formation of regional blocs exclusive of the U.S.S.R., and by expiciting every opportunity to foment diversionary antagonisms among foreign powers.
ad To undermine the unity and strength of particular foreign states by discrediting their leadership, fomenting domestic discord, promoting domestic agitations conducive to a reduction of their military and economic strength and to the adoption of foreign policies favorable to Soviet pur- _ poses, and inciting colonial unrest.
5. Although these general policies are premised upon a conviction of latent and inevitable conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, they also assume a postponement of overt conflict for an indefinite period. The doctrine of Marx and Lenin does not forbid, but rather encourages, expedient compromise or collaboration with infidels for the accomplishment of ultimate Communist pur- poses. The Soviet Union has followed such a course in the past and has need to do so still, for time is required both to build up its own strength and to weaken and divide its assumed antagonists. In such postponement, time is calculably on the side of the Soviet Union, since natural population growth and projected eco- nomic development should result in a gradual increase in its relative strength. It is manifestly in the Soviet interest to avoid an overt test of strength at least until, by this process, the Soviet Unien has become more powerful than any possible combination of opponents. Wo date can be set for the fulfillment of that condition. The Soviet Union sust therefore seek to avoid s major open con- flict for an indefinite period.
6. The basis of Soviet foreign policy is consequently « synthesis between anticipation of and preparation for an ultimate inevitable conflict on the one hand and need for the indefinite postponement of such a conflict on the other. In any matter conceived to be essential to the present security of the Soviet Union, including the Soviet veto power in international councils, Soviet policy will prove adamant. In other matters Soviet policy will prove grasping, but opportunistic and flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resis- tamce encountered, it being conceived more important to avoid provoking a hos- tile combination of major powers than to score an immediate, but limited, gain. But in any case in which the Soviet Union is forced to yield on this account, as in Iran, it may be expec:sed to persist in pursuit of the same end by subtler means.
SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EASTERN EUROPE
7. It is apparent that the Soviet Union regards effective control of Burope east of the Baltic and Adriatic Seas and of the general line Stettin- Trieste as essential to its present security. Consequently it will tolerate no rival influence in that région and will insist on the ssaintenance there of “friendly” governments - that is, governments realistically disposed to accept
the fact of exclusive Soviet domination. That condition being set, the U.5S.5S.R. does not insist upon a uniform pattern of political and economic organization,
ew ee ee
15.
(Continued)
6. Lo kaatberET
but adjusts its policy in sccordance with the local situation. The immediate Soviet objective is effective control, although the ultimate objective may well be universal sovietization. .
6. In some cases no Soviet coercion is required to accomplish the de- sired end. in Yugoslavia and Albania the Soviet Union finds genuinely syz- pathetic governments themselves well able to cope with the local opposition. In Czechoslovakia also, although the government is democratic rather than authoritarian in pattern, no interference is required, since the Communists and related parties constitute a majority and the non-Communist leaders are "friendly." Even in Finland the Soviet Union has been able to display sodersa- tion, Finnish leaders having become convinced that a “friendly” sttitude is essential to the survival of the mation. In these countries the Soviet Unicon seeks to insure its continued predominance by the creation of strong bonds of economic and military collaboration, but does not have to resort to coercion other than that implicit in the circumstances.
9. In Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, the Soviet Union encounters stubborn and widespread opposition. The “friendly” governments installed in those countries are notoriously unrepresentative, but the Soviet Union is nevertheless determined tc maintain them, since no truly representative government could be considered reliable from the Soviet point of view. In deference to Western objections, elections may eventually be beld and some changes in the composi- tion of these governments may be permitted, but only after violent intimidation, thorougbgoing purges, electoral chicanery, and similar measures have insured the “friendly” character of the resulting regime. Continued political control of the countries in question will be reinforced by measures insuring effective Soviet control of their armed forces and their econonies.
10. The elected government of Hungary was both representative and willing to be "friendly," but the Soviet Union has appsrently remained unconvinced of its reliability in view of the attitude of the Hungarian people. Accordingly coercion has been applied to render it unrepresentatively subject to Communist control in the same degree and manner as are the governments of Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The end is the same as that of the policy pursued in those coun- tries -— the secure establishment of a reliably "friendly" regime, however un- representative, coupled with Soviet control of the economic life of the country.
SOVIET POLICY IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY
11. Soviet policy in Austria is similar to that in Hungary, subject to the limitations of quadripartite occupation. Having accepted an elected Austrian government and unable to reconstruct it at will, the Soviet Union is seeking, by unilateral deportations and sequestrations in its ow sone and by demands for similar action in others, to gain, at least, economic domination of the country as « whole and to create, st most, a situation favorable toward « pre- dominant Soviet political influence as well, on the withdrawal of Allied con- trol. The Soviet Union will prevent a final settlement, however, until it is ready to withdraw its troops from Hungary and Rumania as well as Austria.
15.
(Continued)
-e- [peer
12. The Soviet Union hitherto has been content to proceec with the con- solidation of its position in eastern Germany free of quadripartite inter- ference. Wow, rejecting both federalization and the separation of the Rubr and Rhineland, it appears as the champion of German unification in opposition to the “imperalistic”™ schemes of the Western powers. A German administration strongly centralized in Berlin would be more susceptible than any other to Soviet pressure, and the most convenient means of extending Soviet influence to the western frontiers of Germany. The initial Soviet objective is pre- sumably such a centralized “anti-Fascist” republic with a coalition government of the eastern Suropean type, but actually under strong Communist influence and bound to the Soviet Union by ties of political and economic dependency.
-
SOVIET POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE
13. For a time it appeared that the Communist Party in France might prove able to gain control of that country by democratic political processes and Soviet policy was shaped to suprort that endeavor. The Communists recent e- lectoral reverses, however, appear to have led the Soviet Union to sacrifice a fading hope of winning France to a livelier prospect of gaining Germany.
The Prench Communists remain a strong political factor nevertheless, and exer- cise disproportionate influence through their control of organized labor. That influence will be used to shape French policy as may be most suitable for Soviet purposes, and to prepare for an eventual renewal of the attempt to gain control of Yrance by political mean... A resort to force is unlikely in view ofthe danger of provoking a major international conflict.
14. In Italy also the Communist Party is seeking major influence, if not control, by political means, with a resort to force unlikely in present cir- cumstaaces. The Party and the Soviet Union have payed their cards well to divert Italian resentment at the proposed peace terms from themselves toward the Western Powers.
15. The Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raire the Spanish issue as ae means of embarrassing and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain might afford it an opportunity for penetration. Even its goading of the West- ern Powers into expressions of distaste for Pranco sppear to have afforded it an opportunity to approach his.
16. For the rest, the Soviet Union is concerned to prevent the formation of a Western Bloc, including Pranuce and the Low Countries, or a Scandinavian Bloc, in accordance with its general policy. As opportunity offers, it will seek to facilitate the growth of Communist influence in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, but not at the sacrifice of more important interests or at the risk of provoking a strong resection.
SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EaST
17. The Middle East offers a tempting field for Soviet expansion because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and remoteness from other major powers, the weakness and instability of indigenous governments (except Turkey, and the
moettentt
(Continued)
many ‘ocel antagonisms and minority discontents. It is, moreover, am ares of Soviet strategic interest even greater than that of eastern Burope,’' in view of the general shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but still within range of air atteck from the south, and of the vital importance of Baku oil in the Soviet economy. It is in the Middle East, however, that Soviet interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger of precipitating a major conflict. Soviet policy in the ares must therefore be pursued with due caution and flexibility.
16. Given the opportunity, the Soviet Union might be expected to seek the following objectives:
a At least the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, and at most the incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establishment of a "friendly" government.
b. At least the political and military isolation of Turkey and the imposition of a new regime of the Straits more favorable to Soviet in- terests; at most the incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establishment there of a “friendly” government.
, c- At least implementation of the recent settlement with Iran, which assures the Soviet a continued indirect control in Azerbaijan and an opportunity to develop any oil resources in northern Iran; at most, incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establish- ment there of a | *Seientiy® government. '
Soviet policy in pursuit of these objectives will be opportunistic, not ‘only in relation to the local situation, but more particularly in relation to the probable reactions of the major powers.
19. Soviet inturest in the Arab states is still airected rather toward exploiting them as a means of undermining the British position in the Middle East than as objectives in themselves. Their principal asset, the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would be economically inaccessible, although its denial to Britain and the United States in the event of war would be of important consequence. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of Bratish troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey and Iren. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit anti-British sentiment among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue.
20. The Soviet Union has shown no disposition to intrude into the in- volved Indian situation, possibly finding it as yet impossible to determine the most advantageous course in that regard. It also shows no present aggres- sive intentions toward Afghanistan, although the establishment of a "friendly" government there would seem « logical, albeit low priority, objective.
4
SOVIE? POLICY IM THE PAR EAST
21. The basic Soviet objective in Chins, Korea, and Japan is to prevent their becoming putential bases of attack on the Goviet Par East. This requires
(Continued)
that the U.S.S.R. exert with respect to each ap influence at least equal to (and preferably greater than) that of any other power. Since in this region Soviet policy encounters that of the Umitsed States, it must be pursued with due circumspection.
22. Although the Soviet Union cannot hope to establish a predominant in- fluence over the whole of China, at least for a long “ime to come, it could accomplish its basic objective through either the formation of a coaliticn government, with the Chinese Communist Party* as a major participant, or a division of the country, with the Chinese Communist Party in exclusive control of those areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. should logically prefer the former solution as at once involving less danger of a collision with the United States and greater opportunity for the subsequent expansion of Soviet influence throughout China through political penetration by the Communist Party, and the course of its relations with the Chimese Government would seem to con- firm that preference. The U.S.S.R., however, would not be willing to sacrifice the actual political and military independence of the Chinese Communists unless assured of their effective participation in the proposed coalition. If, there- fore, efforts to establish such a coalition were to fail and unrestricted civil war were to ensue, the Soviet Union would probably support the Chinese Commun- ists in their efforts to consolidate their effective control over Manchuria and North China.
23. In Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to the unifica- tion of the country only if assured of «2 “friendly” government. In defeult of unification on such terms, they are content to consolidate their control in the north and to bide their time, trusting that an eventual American withdrawal will permit them to extend *bheir predominant influence over the whole country.
24. The Soviets have been extremely critical of American administration in Japan, which has afforded them no opportunity to establish the degree of influ- ence they desire. Regardless of the prevailing influence, they probably desire to see Japan politically and militarily impotent. The greater Japan's political disorganization, the greater would be their opportunity to establish an equal and eventually predominant influence there.
SOVIET POLICY ELSEWHERE
25. Soviet policy in other areas will follow the general lines set forth in paragraph 3, seeking to undermine the unity and strength of national states, to foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms between states,
* Despite a widespread impression to the contrary, the Chinese Communists are genuine Communists, differing from other foreign Communist Parties only in @ certain local self-sufficiency derived from territorial control and the possession of ap army, in consequence of which they exhibit unusual initia- tive and independence. In all essentials. they are an unusually effective instrument of Soviet foreign polic;
Losier T
(Continued)
-o- ‘[ypeetttr:
and to disrupt any system of | ntermational cooperstion from which the U.S.5.R. is excluded. Activity slong ‘hese lines is constant, though often inconspicu- ous. Ics importance to the Soviet Union derives not from any prospect of. direct gain, but from its effect in enhancing the relative power of the U.S.S5.R. by diminishing that of potential antagonists.
26. Because of their position in world affairs, the United States and Great Britain will be the primary targets of such Soviet activities. In eddi- tion to domestic agitations, the effort will be made to distract and wesken ther by attacks upon their interests in areas of special concern to them. In Latin America, in particular, Soviet and Commurist influence wi'l be exerted to the utmost to destroy the inflaemce of ‘the United States end to cresie antagonisaus disruptive to the Pan American systex.
ee id OE —_—_
(Continued)
1. Soviet military policy derives from that preoccupation with security which is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. (See Enclosure "4", paragraphs 3 and 4s.) On the premise that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capi- talist states is in the lomg run impossible, and that the U.&.6.R. is in cos- stant peril'so long as it remains within a “capitalist encirclement,* it is the policy of the Soviet Union to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible combinstian of foreign powers. The result is an army by far the largest in the world (except the Chinese). |
2. Ewen the populous Soviet Union, however, cannot afford an unlinited diversion of manpower from productive civil pursuits, especially in view of manpower requirements for recomstruction and for the new Five Year Plan. Con- sequently it bas bad to adopt « demobilisation progres which is « compromise between the supposed requirements of security and those of the ecomomy. By September the strength of the armed forces will have been reduced from 12,500,000 to 4,500,000 men."* Purther reduction is unlikely.
3. The probable geographical distribution of the total strength indicated will be 1,100,000 in occupied Burope, 650,000 in the Par East, and 2,759,000 in the remainder of the U.S.&S.R. The composition will be $,200,900 (716) in the ground forces and rear services, 500.000 (116) in the sir forces, 300,000 (78) in the naval forces, and S5SOO,.000 (11%) in the MVD (political security forces). The post-war reorganization includes unification of command in « single Ministry of the Armed Porces having jurisdiction ower all forces except the MVD troops, which remain under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
4. In addition to ite ow forces, the Soviet Union is assisting end par- ticlpating in the reconstitution of the armed forces of its satellites in suck manner as to insure its effective control of ther While in this its object is primarily political, such forces supplement its own as locally useful suri ilier- les.
5S. Soviet experience during the war wes limited aleost exclusively to the employment of large masses of ground troops spearbesded by mobile tank-artillery- infantry teams. Air power was employed chiefly for close ground support. Seval Operations wefe insignificant. The Soviets had omly limited experience in as- phibious operations, almost nome in airborne operations, and none with carrier based air operations.
6. It appears that for the time being the Soviet Union will continue to rely primarily on large sasses of ground troops, but with emphasis on increased . Sechanization and further development of the tank-artillery-scbile iafantry spearhead. The ground support capabilities of the air forces will be maintained.
* As compared with 562.000 in 1933 and 1,000,000 in 1935.
en il ci a ti i i i Me i le ee a aa i tl et
om
15.
(Continued)
- ll =
At the same tire, the Soviets may be expected to give increased attention to the strategic employment of air power, ir view of demonstrated Anglo-American capabilities in that regard, and to develop both fighter defense and iong range bomber forces. ,
7. Although there have been indications that the eventual development of a high seas fleet (or fleets) is a Soviet intention, its early accomplish- ment is p-chibited by inexperience, lack of shipbuilding capacity, and the higher priority of other undertakings. Even were these hindrances overcome, geography handicaps the Soviet Union as a naval power, since naval forces cn its several coasts would be incapable of mutual support. It is, however, within the capabilities of the Soviet Union to develop considerable submarine, light surface, and short-range amphibious forces. _
8 The industrial development, which competes with the armed forces for manpower, is. of course, intended to enhance the overall Soviet war potential. Beyond that, intensive effort will be devoted to the development of special . weapons, with particular reference to guided missiles and the atomic bomb.
Some reports suggest that the Soviets may already have an atomic bomb of sorts, or at least the capability to produce a large atomic explosion. In any case, a maximum effort will be made to produce a practical bomb in quantity at the
earliest possible date.
16. Leahy to General [Hoyt S.] Vandenberg, 12 August 1946 (Photocopy)
1) 7 Fa od
August 12, 1946
MEMORANDUM FOR General Vandenberg:
August 12th Attorney General Clark sent Mr. Tamm of F.B.I, to see mein regard to providing re- iiefs for a FBI. intelligence agents now in latin America. Attorney General wishes that the provision of National intelligenoe Agente be expedited as mush as possible and the Presidert wishes us to comply.
F.B.I. needs its agents for work here within the United States, '
| Positive ob jection was expressed to our PP GO Set, men to discuss our common problems with e¢Veae
It wuld appear advantageous for the Director of C.I. himself to make ali contacts with Mr. Hoover, and thet ex-F.B.I. men now in the C,.I. Group should certainly not be used for such contacts,
Granting that there will be a age | reduction of efficiency fon, tet early relief of F.B.I. sin -
It is certain that we should not employ in the C.I,G. any persons now in Ry and it is my opinion that to avoid offending Mr. Hoover we should not here- ixthertty, eaploy - ox. RE time separated, a
DECLASSIFICD EX. 11652, vec. weap 76 +3) « ©
et, ua, a
17. Leahy to the President, 21 August 1946 (Photocopy)
} F @1 August 1948 From: Admiral Leahy at DERN FED fo: ‘The President ua 1s Yor wilt #abl NARS, Oa for,
The National Intelligence Authority today approved the following quoted directive to be issued by the Authority to General Vandenberg. General Groves approves.
Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal consider it very important that the directive be issued without delay. Secretary
Acheson. stated that your approval should be obtained.
The members of the Authority recommend your approval with - an understanding thet any action taken by the Authority will be without prejudice to future change that may be desired by the
_ Atomic Energy Committees, I recomend approval.
"Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 Jamury 1946, designating this Authority as responsible for plarming, developing, - end coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities so es
to assure the most effective ecoomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security, the following policies and procedures relating to Pederai intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities affecting the national security are announced:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subicct to the direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorised and directed to coordinate the collection by agencies subject to coordination by N.I.A. of all intelligence information related to foreign atomic energy developments and potentialities which may
‘\ arrest the national security, and to socouplish the correlations
17.
(Continued)
evaluation, and appropriate dissemination within the Goverment
of the resulting intelligences. The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorised to arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Goverment to utilize their collection facilities in this field,
2. To accomplish the fimotion assigned in paregraph 1, the Secretary of War end the Oommanfing Generel of the lanhatten Engineer District have suthorised the transfer to the Central Intelligence Group of the personnel and working files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by the Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District, effective at the earliest practicable date.”
ee ep ye
18. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the President, 24 August 1946
(Photocopy)
a “eee atlas 4h.
of near-term Soviet military action.
1. Soviet propagenda against the U.S. and U.K. has reached the highest pitch of violence since Stalin's February speech and follows a line which might be interpreted es preparing the Russien people for Soviet military action.
a It states that "reactionary monopolistic —), and “military adventurers" are now directing U.S. policy toward “world domination” through “atomic” diplomacy. The U.S. has abandoned the Rooseveltian policy which gave hope of collaboration with the 0.5.3.2. and the other "freedom-loving people” of the world.
be It attacks the Anglo-American “bloc” as "dividing the field" throughout the world and gives a detailed account of AnJlo~ American “imperialistic™ actions, including British troop movements to Basre end Palestine and U.S. military operations in China end attempts to secure outlying air bases. °
6. Embassy Moscow interprets the ettacks outlined in & above as notice to the Commmist Party in the 0.5.5.2. that there is mo longer any hope of friendiy relations between the U.5.8.R. and the Western Powers.
d. Tito, in his speech of 21 August on the internstional
Turkey demanding exclusive control by the Black Sea Powers end joint Soviet-Turkish defense of the Straits.
81
(Continued)
> 999 ¢%%-e
7 aed
a. U.S. Military Attache Belgrade in commenting upc. these incidents stated that while he had not previously believed that Russias and Yugoslavia were ready to fight, he regarded these incidents as ircicating that they were willing to risk a “prompt start".
k. Molotov in his speech on the Italian treaty indicated clearly that the Soviets intended to exclude the Western Powers from
Darmbian trade and stated that if Italy respected the most-favored- nation principle she would lose her freedom to the monopolistic capital-
ism of the Western Powers. eS Se ee SS ee eee aggressive Soviet intentions, it may be noted that:
1. We have as yet no information of any change in the Soviet demobilization program. In fact, the latest indications are that it has been slightly accelerated.
2. We have as yet no indications of any unusual troop concen- trations, troop movements, or supply build-ups which would normally pre- cede offensive military action.
3. We have had no indications of any warming to Soviet shipping throughout the world.
k. There appears to be no reason, from the purely econamic
point of view, to alter our previous estimate that because of the ravages of war, the Soviets have vital need for a long period of peace before
embarking upon a major war. S. There are no indications that the Soviets have an operational atom bomb.
In spite of the factors outlined immediately above, the Soviets might conceivably undertake a concerted offensive through Europe and Northern
. Asia on one or a combination or the following assumptions:
ay Sas 6 Siveign Gay Gp eameeatey 0 euiatele Bo pueneet = ty leadership in power, in the face of serious internal discontent. eres
&. There have been indications of discontent in the > Ukraine and in the Murmansk and cther areas. There have been a number of purges. The Soviet press, in appeals to the people for improvement, has revealed internal difficulties in many fields. The recent inauguration RN. gy thal medapeynne yore hy Th, 3 |
(Continued)
b. Although the people of the USSE are tired of war and industrial production is down, is still sufficiently powerful to secure, through propaganda, acceptance of further war.
2. That in view of the strength of the Soviet forces in Northern to
3. That the U.S. was war-weary and would not hold out against a fait accompli in 2 abov..
4. That a combination of militaristic marshals and ideologists might establish ascendancy over Stalin and the Politburo ani decide upon a war of conquest.
a. Evidence to date, however, indicates that the "Party" dominates the military.
In weighing the various elements in this complex situation the most plausible conclusion would appear to be that, until there is some specific evidence that the Soviets are making the necessary military preparations amd dispositions for offensive operations, tha recent disturbing develop-
by an atmosphere of international crisis. However, with the Soviet diplomatic offensive showing signs of bogging down, the possibility of direct Soviet military action or irresponsible action by Soviet satellites can not be disregarded.
re General,
19. Ludwell L. Montague, Memorandum for General Vandenberg,
“Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE,” 24 September 1946
(Typed transcript) cae deiiateea' sg - 1952 "Souvenirs of JIC-CIG* a +. by mawh for al. 7" )
MEMORANDIM FOR GEVERAL VANDENBERG Subject: Procurement of Key Personnel for ORE
1. Pram the beginning the crucial problem in the develop- ment of an organisation capable of producing high-level "strategic and national policy intelligence" has been the procurement of key personnel qualified by aptitude and experience to anticipate intelligence needs, to exercise critical judgment regarding the material at hand, and to discern emergent trends. Such persons
intelligence organization in Washington was the Military Intelli- gence Service. If, in the course of demobilization, we had had its full cooperation in recruitment, we might now be in a far better position to produce the sort of intelligence desired. sip
2. When CIG was set up the largest and strongest af
We have, indeed, received from G-2 a considerable number of low grade persorme: which it was compelled to cull out through reductions in strength, but, in disappointing contrast to the attitudes of State and Navy, we have had no assistance and some obstruction from G-2 in the procurement of key personnel. In consequence the Intelligence Division, WDGS, which had most to contribute to ORE in this respect, has made the least con tion of any agency, and we have been compelled to use not-so- well qualified Naval officers in positions which could have been appropriately filled from G-2. $3.
3. We have made repeated attempts to secure the cooperation of G-2 in this matter, without success. We have been unable to obtain either nominations on general requisition or the assigment of specified individuals. Two cases illustrate the attitude we have encountered.
a. We sought the assignment of Dr. Robert H. McDowell, reputedly the outstanding intelligence specialist on the Middle East, to Ore, where his capabilities would be available to the common benefit of the three Departments. After long evasion and, we understood, an eventual agree- ment to release him, G-2 refused to do so on the ground
Aso Fied w Ksfhe-¥s Ia#Aa 10°
cova ; G0COSC
Dat«-? * DEC
ae 6 Pf 2
they considered their best.
sought the assignment of Lt. Col. David S.
we Crist, who was om duty, not in G-2, tut in ACC mania.
reassigmment, however, had to be arranged through which, on learning of his availability, grabbed hin tself. The G-2 attitude was that as long as he
remained in the Amy he must serve (against his will) in
He could come to CIG only by exercising his option, gory Iv officer, to leave the service. But when
Crist actually reached Washington he was warmed in G-2
t he had better not sign up with CIG, even as a civilian. As long as this attitude persists CIG will not only be
handicapped in recruiting properly qualified key personnel for
t the Intelligence Division of the War Department General will be properly represented in ORE, to its dis- tage as well as our om.
LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE Acting Deputy Asst. Director Research and Evaluation
20. Vandenberg, Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations [Donald Galloway}, “Functions of the Office of Special Operations,”’ 25 October 1946 (Signed draft)
si+
This Cocunent is _§
MEMORANTUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR POR SPECIAL opmearrond + ivterical intorc~ sera. .Sehhe *
SUBJECT: Functions of the Office of Special Operations Storicci 8 ae? Hame: ow Date:
l. The Office of Special Operations will function in accordance with
the following policies: a. The mission of the Office of Special Operations is the conduct,
under the direct supervision of the Director, of all organized Federal espionage
and coumterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions
for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the
nat ional security. Such espionage and counterespiomage operations may involve
semi-overt and semi-covert activities for the full performance of the mission. b. The Assistant Director for Special Operations will be directly
responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for carrying out the S |
missions assigned hia, for the security of operational material and methods e
and for tie collection of secret foreign intelligence information required we
the Office of Collection and Dissemination and other user departments ani : agencies. gz
c- The Office of Special Operations will coordinate its co collection activities with other agencies of the Central Intelligence So charged with camparable functions.
4. All intelligence information collected by the Office of Special Operations will be put in usable form, graded as to source and reliability, and delivered as spot information to the Office of Research and Evaluation or to
ve. ° other departments and agencies whengdiveatiy paguastad. The Office of Special
Operations will carry out no research ani evaluation functions other than those
pertaining to counterespionage intelligence and to the grading of source and reliability. ;
@- In order to provide « basis for grading future intelligence in- formation to be collected by the Office of Special Operations the information collected will be carefully screened by the Office of Research and Evaluation. The latter office will render a periodic report indicating the intelligence value of information obtained in each area of operations.
f. Ordinarily requests for specific information will come from the State, War, Nevy and other departments and agencies through the Office of Collection ani Dissemination, where it will be determined that the Office of Special Operations is the proper agency to collect the desired information. However, the Office of Special Operations is authorised to receive directly from user departments or agencies requests for a specific action or the eollection of specific information when such requests are clearly within the sphere of activity of the Office of Special Operations and the particular type of desired information (or action) make such direct contact necessary for seourity reasons. Such direct contact will be made through the Office of Con- trol, Special Operations, ani corresponding offices in the various departaents amd agencies. The Office of Special Operations will maintain direct liaison With departments and agencies of the Federal Goverment on secret operational matters, knowledge of which must be restricted to the minimm mmber of persons.
& ‘The Office of Special Operations will be responsible for the
collection, processing, and distribution of foreign counterespionsge intelli geme
information ani will be the repository for such information. Intelligence
derived from the processing of foreign counterespionage intelligence information
will be made available to the Office of Research and Bvaluation.
<-_- CONFIDENTIAL
TOP-SECRET
—
2. Major support services for the Office of Special Operations wili be provided by the Special Projects Division, Personnel ani Administrative Branch of the Executive Staff, Centra] Intelligence Group, under the operational direction of the Assistant Director for Special Operations.
3. Im carrying out the policies stated above operational security re- quirements will be strictly observed by all concerned.
Director of Central Intelligence
COBCUR: Assistant Director for Special Operations: 4 — — ESTP
21. CIG Intelligence Report, 15 December 1946 (Ditto copy)
CE GROUP
IMTE!LIGESICE REPORT
FRAL INTELLIGEN
CEN
32 - li ei | F i pi 1 \iF: 1: ot iz eae in
Had: TELE
5s
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-
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f
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| Fg ala? a “
| ?
’ '
i r
a >
22. Donald Edgar, Memorandum for the Executive to the Director {Edwin K. Wright], “An Adequacy Survey of “The Adequacy Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Sumniaries’ as it was Pre- pared by OCD on 9 December 1946,” 2 January 1947
Li y= oe
re
2 January 1917
MEXRANDUM FCR THE EXEQUTIVE TO THE DIRECTO:
Subjeci:: An Adequacy Survey of the "The Adequacy Survey of the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries" as it was Prepared by OCD on 9 December 1914.
1. A reading of the O@ document shows:
a. The daily was variously criticised for the selections, the fullness of detail, the lack of proper identification of persons mentioned, the lack of high-lighting, etc.
b. The week"y was variously criticised far the selections, its overlong ite: _, lack of synopses, eté.
Cc. The CIG Special Reports were unanimously Despite = and b, the general tenor of the paper is that the situation is good.
(
paige. ath. aah HG AE liss! Rees o aa 3 PER EE Hdd if sme il REE dpezagilaedst atk aap athe 33 3hq aly ‘fi “Viva: HT ti “ale
r fl 3 Sree : ih te allel with
Tr | : fed aa ial jl |
alg Si ual al in
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(Continued)
' -SONFIDENTIAL
11. Mothing should be included which cannot be classified as “must reading® for the President personally.
12. It should always be remembered that any policy paper being consideration
intelligence reports should, therefore, be designed, not to duplicate nor overlap this type of material, but to supply the President in advance with the broadest background so that he will mot feel that
gence affecting the or development of policies by those Cabinent members is made available to thes whether it comes from State, War or Navy sources or not. The sme exacting standard of presentation, i.e., direct writing without overwriting and without underwriting should obtain at this the Cabinent level. And it is possible that eventually a special service for the directors of
several
levels for ready reference as and when required either to check against departmental intelligence or to supplant it. Special supplements should, of course, be written as required.
16. The above, ia my opinion, covers the fields of current intelligence and what might be described as national policy intelli- gence, the former perhaps being also one form of national policy intelligence.
17. To complete its mission, CIG should maintain up-to-date
fact books om all strategic areas of the wrld. A proposed program in this field (the development of national intelligence digests) has
whether prepared by the American Goverment, by the British,
revised, corrected,or brought up-to-date. This is a continuing process and no handbook should be considered as a finished product. Therefore, handbooks should have a loose leaf desig permitting easy revision of amall sections. This design also permits the easy creation and distribution of amall operational handbooks on special subjects merely by assembling selected
i determination by CIG of tae need for revision,
be reached with the pertinent agency as to whether revision will be made by CIG or by the agency. -L-
(
) be
If properly selected personnel is svailable to do the above i.e., (1) current intelligence; (2) situation
ees Sos
ORE! DENN te a eo a
23. CIG, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 1/1, “Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs,” 6 January 1947
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ORE 1/1 6 January 1947
ao
(Continued)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
REVISED SOVIET TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL APPAIRS
Indications of a Change in Soviet Tactics
l. The USSR has spparently decided that for the time being more
subtle tactics should be employed in implementing ite basic foreign and military policy (see ORE 1, dated 23 July 1946). Recent develop- ments indicating this decision include:
@. Soviet concessions on the Trieste issue.
b. Soviet acceptance of the pri-ciple of free mavigation on ° the Danube.
¢. Soviet agreement in principle to international inspection of armaments and to eliminate the veto in the work of the conten- plated atomic and disarmament commissions. ,
d. Indications of substantial reductions in Soviet occupa- tion forces.
@. Failure of the USSR to render effective support to Azer- bai jan.
{. Agreement of the Security Council to investigate respons- ibility for disorders on the Greek frontier.
g. Relaxation from former extreme position of interpreting abstention as a veto to meaning not an expression of a veto.
bh. Agreement to have Foreign Ministers’ Deputies meet in _auden Sectre the Sorthecsing Sesser Centerense to dou up draft treaty for Austria and Germany.
Considerations Conducive Toward a Change in Tactics
2. There are a number of considerations, both international and tic, which appear to have convinced the Kremlin of the desirabil-
ity of a temporary change of course:
eer
(Continued)
3. include:
U Soa,
International considerations in estimated order of impor tance
a. The firm policy of the Western Powers, especially the US; realization that a further expansion of Soviet control in Bu-
rope cannot be accomplished by force without risk of wer; and the desire to placate the US and the UK in order to encourage a relax- ation of Western vigilance, to strengthen the hand of Western ad- vocates of a conciliatory policy toward the USER, and to obtain economic aid from the West for screly needed rehabilitation.
b. The benefits to the USSR from a reduction in its occupe-
tion forces. With effective control ower Soviet-dominated areas
forces, especially in view of the increased mechanization of the remiining troops. A reduction in occupation forces would heave the following benefits:
(1) Release of additional manpower sorely needed for the Soviet internal economy.
(2) Reduction of antagonism throughout the world.
(3) Alleviation of a major cause of popular hostility toward the Communist Parties in occupied areas where local elements have been disillusioned and eliensted by ruthless Soviet reparations policies, the comduct of Soviet troops amd the burden of subsisting these troops.
(4) A basis for attempting to induce further reductions of occupation forces by the Western Powers. The US&R will undoubtediy use any drastic reduction in ite occupation forces to support a campaign of diplomacy and propaganda to secure further reductions in the occupation forces of the Western
Powers. Proportionate reductions by all of the Allied Powers
(Continued)
¢- The USGR's need of support. at internetional gatherings from the emaller mations outeide the Soviet bloc which have re-
cently been aligning themselves with Anglo-American positions in opposition to arbitrary Soviet tactics. d. Net advantages to the USSR of general disarmament among the mijor powers. The realization of & general disarmament pro- gram would result in a decided relative advantage to the Soviet Union. Whereas the Western Powers derive their military strength from extensive navies, strategic air forces ami intricate modern weapons, that of the USGR is still essentially tesed on mes land armies. Once reduced, therefore, the war potential of the West would require years to restore, while that of the USSR would be :
substantially restored merely by the re~mobilizing of minpower.
4. wich would have equal weigh, in producing a temporary let tactics are:
Internal economic comditions. The comdition of Soviet
meet the quotas prescribed by the Fourth Five-Year Plan.- As a result, the Kremlin my have been forced to revise ite estimate of the proportions of the mational economy which could be di-
verted to military purposes, because the immediate needs of the UBGR, particularly the devastated areas, have exceeded what it was reasonable to plan for industry to produce.
b. Civilian morale. There are increasing signs of apathy, and even unrest, among the Soviet populace. Shortages in food, roe end consumer goods have created widespread dissatisfac- tion. The vigorous campaign of “ideological cleansing* indicates the concern with which the Kremlin views the situation.
¢- Morale among former occupati«n troops. the eceupation has furnished a large number of Soviet citizens with their first opportunity to view the outside world. The “bourgeois fleshpots" of Germany, Austria, and the Balkans have produced disillusion- ment, « reluctance to return to the USSR, and « substantial mam- ber of desertions.* Demobilized occupation troops are spreading the infection throughout the USGR, which is probably an | mportant -element in current damestic dissatiéfaction. ‘“e large-scale
The Department of State cons ders this sentence too strong because it implies that these conditions are rather prevalent. C.1.G. and the War and Navy Departments, however, consider that these condi- eee
“Se Neer
o8s itedyt ; | 8 i) Gey Hemel iat 8 ie a A iy A tn PHHERE Ei tei fo UL eimnedst it ft EE ie 3 iti é T 2a yf aH : iB ; yaa ae ee * | es , ee . TH i tt a i te hii Heh ele Ht resins ap : igis i | Hit at be i 7 “ij th
(
(Continued)
— fidently predict for the near future. . en :
‘6. Recent developments have confirmed previous estimates that “the USSR did not intend and was not in a position to engage in imme- ' diate military conquests. Its ultimate action will depend upon future developments in the Soviet Union and in the outside world. . the USSR is seeking to consolidate its positions abroad and to improve its economic and psychological position at home, while encouraging dis- armament end pecitian.in the rest of the world.
7. Soviet tactics, however, will remain flexible end opportunis- tic. The Kremlin has never relied exclusively on any single line of action. Rather, its tactics are based on the inter-play of two apper-
ently-conflicting courses, international collaboration and unilateral aggression, and on its ability suddenly to shift from ome to the other. This technique seeks to achieve maximm surprise for each new move, and to promote such confusion and uncertainty among the opposition as to prevent the development of any long-range counter-stretegy. Thus, in view of the considerations described in the preceding pages, new tactics of compromise and conciliation have been adopted merely as a matter of expediency. They will be employed only in those situations where they are deemed to further Soviet foreign and military policy as descrived in ORE 1.
i
24. Walter L. Pforzheimer, Memorandum for the Record,
“Proposed Legislation for C.1.G.,” 28 January 1947 (Typed transcript)
alg ia | : .; eee i Ra L Srensertbed “\guly 1952 lad 7 a ae aon by mawh for . > Security act of 194;7) satire — of ar WY > CHtid «, ALaerck: 42 (2 Subject: il ee Sometime shortly after 1600 hours on 22 January 1947, a copy
of the proposed National Defense act of 1917 was delivered to the Director of Central Intelligence for comment on those sections
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A conference with the Director established the policy that m attempt should not be made to remove fram the Defense Act all but a bare of the Central Intelligence Agency, and introduce a separate CIG The Director also indicated his desire to have included a provision
serve us the advisor to the Council on National Defense ters pertaining to intelligence, and that in this capacity he wuld all meetings of the Council. It was agreed that the Director take no part in the decisions of the Council as this was a policy long been agreed that Central Intelligence should involved in policy making,
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proposed CIG enabling Act had been submitted to
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(Continued)
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In connection with paragraph 1 (b) of reference memorandum, it was agreed to make same mention of centralised intelligence in the declaration of policy in the proposed bill. This suggestion had strong support fram A@miral Sherman, although it was initially thought by the others present that it might prove cumbersome.
In connection with paragraph 1 (c) of reference masorandm, it was felt that this suggestion was non-controversial and that the appropriate definitions would be acceptable.
In connection with paragraph 1(d) of reference memorandum, General Vandenberg stated that he was strongly opposed to the Central Intelligence | Agency or its director participating in policy decisions on ay matter. However, he felt that he should be present at meetings of the Council.
To this General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he felt that the
umworkable at meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman Suggested, however, that the Director should normally be present at meetings of the Council, in its discretion. General Vandenberg concurred in this, as did General Norsted, and it was accepted with the additional proviso that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wuld also attend meetings at the discretion of the Council.
General Vandenberg indicated ths difficulties which he had had having to go to the N.J.A. om so many problems. He felt that the diffi- culties of his position would be multiplied, as he would have to ask Policy guidance and direction from the Council on National Defense, which consists of many more maubers than the N.I.A. He was assured that the intent of the act was that the Cla wuld operate indepemdantly and come
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General ¥ withdrew the opposition voiced in the last sentence of paragraph 1 (e) of reference menorandm.
the Director pointed out the difficulties of operation of clandestins methods in the absence of detailed legislation, empowering him to operate
was requested further that this draft be submitted by evening of the 23 Jarnary 1917, in order te meet necessary deadlines,
It was the final sense of the mosting that the Director of Central Intelligence should report to the Council on National Defense. As General
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have specific approval from the Council on each action.
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(Continued)
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in on Jamary 1917 by the undersigned, after one or
On 25 January, the undersigned t alked with Mr. Murphy, and informed that all but the barest mention of CIA would be omitted, as the
It had been /alt by the drafting committee that the mbstantive portions of the proposed CIG draft were too controversial and subject to attack by other agencies. It was further felt that the Gmeral Authorities were rather controversial fran a Congressional point of view, but that
The above infomation was tranamitted to the Deputy Director (Colonel Wright), who cabled General Vandenberg of the develoments.
Colonel Wright spoke with admiral Leahy, to request information as to whether Murphy's position granted us a gre@ light on our om legis- lation. The Admiral was